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This thesis started with a simple question that teased my interest, does Norway have a 
populist radical right party? Most European countries do, and the literature was unclear as to 
whether the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) should be considered members of this party 
family. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to clear the air with regards to the FrP and 
investigate whether this party is in fact a populist radical right party, based on the criterions 
of membership laid out by Mudde (2007), identified as the ideological features of 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism. I have chosen the methodological approach of 
qualitative content analysis to analyze whether the FrP should be considered a populist 
radical right party. I have analyzed official party documents, meaning the party’s website and 
their election manifestos, arguing that these documents constitute the core ideological 
features of this party. What I have found, and will argue throughout this thesis, is that the 
official party literature of the FrP contains enough evidence of the core ideological features 
of the Populist Radical Right to include the party in this party family.  
 
KEY WORDS: AUTHORITARIANISM, THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY, 


























This thesis marks the end of five years spent as a student at the University in Bergen. During 
these five years I have learnt a lot, met countless new friends and even got to spend a 
semester abroad. These five years have been fantastic, both in terms of the things that I have 
learned academically, but also with regards to all the great people I have gotten to know.  
 
There are several people who needs to be thanked. First and foremost, I want to thank all of 
my fellow students that I have gotten to know during these five years. A big thank you also 
goes to my supervisor Jonas Linde, for insightful advice and feedback during the writing of 
this thesis. Friends and family also deserve their share of thanks.  
 
Finally, to Madelén, without you, I would not be where I am today.  
 
Bergen, June 2021. 



























Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ......................................................................................................... 6 
Thesis outline ......................................................................................................................................7 
Chapter 2 - The emergence of the Populist Radical Right – an overview .......................... 8 
A new party family emerges ...............................................................................................................8 
Differentiating between the extreme right and the radical right .........................................................8 
The three waves of far right success .................................................................................................10 
Explanations for the electoral success of far right parties .................................................................12 
Demand-side explanations ................................................................................................................13 
Supply-side explanations ...................................................................................................................15 
How to conceptualize the populist radical right party family ...........................................................18 
Chapter 3 - Defining and operationalizing the Populist Radical Right Party.................. 23 
Authoritarianism ................................................................................................................................23 
Operationalizing authoritarianism .....................................................................................................26 
Authoritarian policy initiatives ..........................................................................................................28 
Authoritarian moral values ................................................................................................................29 
Nativism ............................................................................................................................................29 
Nativism and its exclusionary nature ................................................................................................30 
The new master frame of the far right ...............................................................................................30 
The development and employment of welfare chauvinism...............................................................32 
Operationalizing nativism .................................................................................................................33 
Exclusionary ethno-pluralism............................................................................................................33 
Welfare chauvinism ...........................................................................................................................34 
Populism ............................................................................................................................................35 
The thin ideology of populism ..........................................................................................................36 
Populism as a rhetorical tool and leadership style ............................................................................39 
Operationalizing populism ................................................................................................................41 
Democracy reforms ...........................................................................................................................42 
Elite criticism ....................................................................................................................................43 
Chapter 4 - Methodological approach and data ................................................................. 44 
Qualitative Content Analysis.............................................................................................................44 
Coding frame .....................................................................................................................................46 
Data material .....................................................................................................................................51 
Chapter 5 - The history of the Norwegian Progress Party................................................. 55 
The genesis of the FrP (the populist roots of the FrP).......................................................................55 
The Electoral breakthrough of the FrP ..............................................................................................57 
 5 
The setbacks of the late seventies......................................................................................................58 
From a disorganization to organization – Carl I. Hagen takes control ..............................................60 
The inclusion of anti-immigration policies in the FrP ......................................................................61 
The FrP sharpens their stance on immigration ..................................................................................65 
Internal unrest – liberals vs far right actors .......................................................................................67 
Dolkesjø – A liberal exodus ..............................................................................................................68 
2001 – the national conservatives are kicked out ..............................................................................69 
Jensen leads the FrP into government ...............................................................................................72 
Chapter 6 - An analysis of the authoritarian, nativist, and populist elements in the 
Norwegian Progress Party .................................................................................................... 74 
The Authoritarianism of the FrP .......................................................................................................74 
Authoritarian policy initiatives in the FrP .........................................................................................74 
The Moral Values of the FrP .............................................................................................................80 
Analysis of the nativist features in the FrP........................................................................................81 
Welfare chauvinism and the FrP .......................................................................................................82 
Populism and the FrP ........................................................................................................................86 
The Democracy reforms of FrP .........................................................................................................86 
The Party for the Common Man........................................................................................................89 
Chapter 7 - Discussion and concluding remarks ................................................................ 92 
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................94 













Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The post-World War II era in European party politics saw the rise of a new party family, the 
populist radical right. Parties belonging to this party family have been heavily scrutinized and 
often labelled as racist, populist, xenophobic and anti-democratic. Most European countries 
have a populist radical right party present in their national political scene, and in some 
countries, they have even held governmental positions. Several governments from member 
states in the European Union have been either entirely made up by parties from the populist 
radical right party (PRRP) family or have included or had support by parties from this party 
family. This list includes countries like Hungary and Poland, where Fidez and the Law and 
Justice party, currently hold governmental power. Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Slovakia, 
Denmark and the UK are also countries who belong to this list. In other countries, where 
PRRPs have not held governmental power, their impact is still firmly felt in the national 
political arena. Sweden and France are good examples of such cases. In Sweden, The 
Swedish Democrats (SD) received 17,5% of the votes in the general election of 2018, and 
although all other parties in the Swedish Parliament refuse to work with them, their presence 
is still felt. In France the leader of the National Rally, formerly known as the Front National, 
Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential elections in 2002. After 
assuming the leadership positions from her father, Marine Le Pen reached the second round 
of the presidential elections in 2017. The presence of this party family is not only limited to 
national political arenas, in the European Union parties belonging to the PRRP-family have 
held seats for a long time and are currently represented in the parliamentary group called 
“Identity and Democracy”. Parties in this group include the Freedom Party from Austria, the 
Finns Party from Finland, the League from Italy, the Alternative for Germany and the Party 
for Freedom from the Netherlands.  
 
However, there is one case that is often contested in the literature as to whether it merits 
inclusion in the populist radical right party family, and that is the Norwegian Progress Party 
(FrP). Cas Mudde, the Dutch scholar who conceptualized the populist radical right party 
family as being authoritarian, nativist and populist, excludes the FrP from this family. Mudde 
(2007) argues that authoritarianism, nativism and populism does not constitute core 
ideological features of the FrP, furthermore, the party has a broad liberal faction, which 
according to Mudde, excludes them from the PRRP-family. I found this intriguing, because if 
the FrP is not a populist radical right party, then Norway would be one of a few European 
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countries that does not have such a party represented in their parliament. Therefore, the aim 
of this thesis is to investigate whether the Norwegian Progress Party is in fact a populist 
radical right party. My thesis aims to clear the air with regards to the FrP and the populist 
radical right. To answer the question of whether the FrP is a PRRP, I have conducted a 
qualitative analysis of official party documents, such as their website and election manifestos. 
This has been done in an attempt to uncover whether the ideological features of the populist 
radical right are in fact part of the core ideological features of the FrP or not.  
 
Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I present a comprehensive overview of the 
scholarly field of research on parties belonging to the far right. This chapter will be reviewing 
how the scholarly field has evolved, as well as looking at the main explanations for the 
emergence and electoral success of these parties. Chapter 3 will deal more specifically with 
the populist radical right party family. This chapter aims at defining, conceptualizing and 
operationalizing the ideological features of this party family, identified as authoritarianism, 
nativism and populism. Chapter 4 will deal with the methodological approach I have chosen, 
qualitative content analysis, to answer my research question of whether the FrP should be 
considered as a populist radical right party. In this chapter I will explain what this research 
method entails, how I have utilized it in my analysis, as well as the data I have chosen to 
analyse. Chapter 5 is dedicated to a descriptive and analytical analysis of the development of 
the FrP, from its genesis and up to recent times. I will be reviewing and analysing important 
developments in the party’s history, in order to gain a better understanding of the party, its 
ideological roots and the development of its ideological content. The final two chapters, 
chapter 6 and 7, is dedicated to the analysis of the ideological features of the populist radical 
right in the FrP. These chapters will analyse these features, discussing my findings and 
conclude the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 - The emergence of the Populist Radical Right – an 
overview 
 
This chapter will try to achieve several things. Firstly, it will function as the theoretical 
backbone of my thesis, meaning that I will be explaining what traditionally is to be 
understood as the populist radical right party family. I will show how this party family has 
been defined and conceptualized, in order to gain an understanding of what it is that these 
parties have in common. Secondly, I will be giving a broad overview of the scholarly 
research into this party family, focusing on explanations as to why and how these parties 
were established. In this part I will be focusing on demand side and supply side explanations. 
The goal in this part is not to come to an overall conclusion on the reasons for the success of 
far-right parties, but rather to give an explanation of the most usual scholarly explanations for 
the emergence and electoral success of these parties. The third part of chapter two will be a 
further deep dive into the concepts that define the populist radical right. In this part I will 
present the defining characteristics of this party family, identified as authoritarianism, 
nativism and populism, and explain what these three ideological features entail, and 
furthermore how I have operationalized them in this thesis.  
 
A new party family emerges 
In this section I will review some of the most influential scholarly contributions on the 
emergence and electoral success of far right parties. However, since my thesis only deals 
with a particular party family of the far right, the populist radical right, it is important that we 
understand the difference between the far right, the extreme right and the radical right.  
 
Differentiating between the extreme right and the radical right 
The emergence of these new parties in the post-World War II era led to a considerable 
amount of scholarly attention. Early on this attention was directed at trying to define the 
common features of these parties, as well as naming them. Parties that emerged on the far 
right of the political spectrum were named many things, among these names were “right-
wing populist”, “radical right-wing”, “populist authoritarian”, “extreme right” and “populist 
radical right”. Although many of the parties that went under these names are now considered 
part of the populist radical right party family, there is one distinction that it is important to 




The extreme right and the radical right both go under the umbrella term of the far right, and it 
is generally agreed upon that far right actors share the ideological features of anti-
egalitarianism, nativism and authoritarianism (Jupskås and Leidig 2020). A far right actor can 
either be a person, party or organization, but it can also be a website or movement. The 
difference, however, between far right extremism and radicalism lays in the actor’s views on 
democracy and how change should be made. The far right extremists are anti-democratic and 
view violence as a legitimate course of action. The best-known examples of parties or 
organizations belonging to the extreme right are neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties, such as the 
Nordic Resistance Movement in Scandinavia, the Atomwaffen Division based in the south of 
the US and Blood & Honour from the UK. The extreme part of the term stems from these 
actors’ anti-democratic attitudes, attitudes that outright reject democracy and its institutions 
such as free and fair elections. For example, Carter (2005) argues that these actors not only 
reject the procedural aspects of democracy, but that they also reject the fundamental values of 
democracy and its institutions. Furthermore, these actors are also considered extreme because 
they often promote violence as, in their view, a legitimate source of action. This behavioural 
aspect of the extreme right manifests itself both in violent actions and the rhetorical 
protection of such actions. These actors are considered right-wing because they defend the 
positions that human beings belong to different social hierarchies, according to this line of 
thinking, people are usually divided into “in-groups” and “out-groups”. These groups are 
usually defined on the basis of ethnicity. The most prominent and well-known example of 
this would be neo-Nazist belief that the Aryan race is racially supreme, and all other human 
races are viewed as inferior. The Aryans would thus be considered as the “in-group”, while 
everybody else who is not considered Aryan would belong to the “out-group”.  
 
The primary difference between the radical right and the extreme right would thus be their 
differing view on democracy, human equality and violence. Whereas the extreme right often 
will reject the fundamental principles of democracy, defend the use of violence and the 
division of humans into different social hierarchies, the radical right will not share these 
ideas. Another fundamental difference between the extreme and the radical right is the 
political tactics these actors view as legitimate. The extreme right, as explained earlier, will 
view violence as a legitimate source of action. The radical right, however, will not. A radical, 
whether situated on the right, left or centre on the political spectrum, will view societal 
changes as something that should happen progressively and not through the use of violence. 
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Therefore, the term radical can refer both to the tactics used and how much an actor believes 
that society should change. An actor that believes changes should happened inside the 
established legal framework and that does not want to fundamentally change the frameworks 
of democracy would therefore be considered a radical.  
 
As I have now established the main difference between the radical right and the extreme 
right, I will move on to explaining how the far right have developed after the end of World 
War II. In the next section I will explain how far right success have happened in three waves 
(Von Beyme 1988), and that the scholarly research on the topic have closely followed these 
waves (Mudde 2016).  
The three waves of far right success 
Klaus von Beyme (1988) noted that the development of the electoral success of far right 
parties had come in three distinct phases, or waves as he called them. Von Beyme also 
delineates between these phases by explaining the ideological development and difference 
between the different phases. The first phase he called “post-war neo-fascism”, but it is also 
sometimes referred to as the nostalgic wave. This wave consisted of parties that had links to 
the previous Nazi and Fascist governments, particularly in Germany and Italy, but also to 
some degree in Spain and France. This wave, however, quickly faded out, and was followed 
by what von Beyme dubbed “new waves of social deprivation”, which may be referred to 
more accurately as the anti-tax wave.  
 
The anti-tax wave started in France when shopkeeper Pierre Poujade started the Union 
de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans (UDCA), which to begin with was a movement of 
artisans and small shopkeepers who protested against the french governments tax inspectors, 
who were taking action against tax fraud (Shields 2004). Later it developed into a political 
party and contested its first regional elections in 1956 where it received 12.3% of the votes. 
Poujadism, as this movement has come to be known, lacked clear ideological features, in part 
because the Poujadist movement was born out of protest, against economic and social change 
(Shields 2000). The adherents of Poujadism were protesting against french taxation laws, but 
many of them were also opposed to structural changes in french society that they perceived as 
a threat to their identity and the identity of rural France. The Poujadist movement however, in 
this context, is significant because it signaled the start of the anti-tax wave of far right parties, 
which soon spread to northern Europe. In the beginning of the 1970s, Denmark and Norway 
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were the scene of the birth of two new anti-tax parties, the Danish Progress Party founded by 
Mogens Glistrup and its Norwegian sister party founded by Anders Lange, that eventually 
became the Norwegian Progress Party. It was the birth of these parties, as Mudde (2017, 151) 
notes, that first severely challenged Rokkan’s hypothesis of the frozen party systems of 
Western Europe.  
 
Von Beyme (1988) called the third wave of far right success for the “unemployment and 
xenophobia” phase. This wave has shown to be broader than the two first, and encompasses 
most, if not all, of Europe. Von Beyme notes that the most prominent example is found in 
Front National from France, but he also highlights far right parties from many other European 
countries, like Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. This third wave, being the broadest 
and most prominent of all the phases of far right electoral success, will be covered more in 
subsequent sections when I review the explanations for these parties’ electoral success.   
 
Just as von Beyme (1988) argued that the success of far right parties has happened in three 
waves, Mudde (2016) argues that also the scholarly research into these parties evolved in 
three phases. These phases closely followed the phases that von Beyme theorized. Mudde 
explains that the first phase of scholarly research was mostly descriptive and historical in 
nature and lasted from around 1945 to the 1980s. This phase of scholarly research was fairly 
limited however, and most of the literature from this period was published in French and 
German.  
 
Wave number two, according to Mudde (2016), lasted roughly from the 1980s to the 2000s. 
While the first wave was dominated by descriptive historical literature, the second wave saw 
an influx of literature from the social scientific world. In this period researchers focused on 
demand-side explanations for why these parties were electorally successful. These studies 
tried to explain the emergence of these parties by analysing the grievances that created the 
demand for these parties. In other words, the parties were treated as the dependent variable, 
and researcher tried to find out what made people vote for them. However, Mudde (2016) 
notes that several of these studies were of limited quality because they relied on weak 
secondary data, and they only studied a small sample of parties from Western Europe. 
Despite this, there are some really important and influential work stemming from this era of 
research, the following should be of particular interest for anyone reading about the far right: 
Betz (1994), Betz and Immerfall (1998), Ignazi (1992), Kitschelt (1997), and Taggart (1995). 
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The third phase took off from were the second ended, at the start of the twenty-first century. 
In this period, researchers started focusing on supply-side explanations for far right parties’ 
success. This meant a shift from studying these parties as dependent variables, to also treating 
them as independent variables. The next section deals with the research that tries to explain 
the emergence, impact and electoral success of far right parties. It will thus further explain 
demand-and supply-side explanations for the emergence of far right parties.  
 
Explanations for the electoral success of far right parties 
In this section I will review some of the most popular theories that try to explain the 
emergence and subsequent electoral success of far right parties. The explanations for the 
electoral success of far right parties have generally focused on either demand-side or supply-
side explanations (Golder 2016). Theories that deal with the political issues or grievances that 
causes people to vote for, and thus demand, far right parties are labelled demand-side 
explanations. Generally, demand-side studies have focused on theories about modernization, 
economy and culture. Supply-side explanations, on the other hand, focuses on factors such as 
political opportunity structure, the ideological appeal of the parties and other organizational 
features of these parties. In general, one can say that demand-side explanations focus on 
factors that make these parties appealing from a voter’s perspective, while supply-side 
explanations focus on factors that are important for electoral success from the party’s 
perspective. In this part of thesis, the goal is to review the most frequently researched 
explanations for far right success. Although there might be, and in many instances are, other 
studies and researchers that disagree with these explanations and theories of the emergence of 
the far-right, the goal here is not to come to a conclusion on the reasons for the electoral 
success for far right parties. The point of this section is simply to show the different and most 
influential explanations that have been offered as reasons for these parties’ success. I will 








Demand side explanations deal with factors that make these parties appealing for voters. I 
have decided to focus on the most common demand-side explanations, which I will argue are 
theories around modernization and cultural and economic grievances.  
  
Scholars that link far right support to modernization theories tend do so with the premise that 
the losers in a modernized and post-industrial society are left alienated and are prone to vote 
for far right parties. Golder (2016) argues that the underlying premise in this theory is that 
there is a latent support for far right parties in every society, and this support is activated 
when modernization causes crisis for parts of the population. Ronald Inglehart has dedicated 
much of his time to explain how modernization has changed modern day societies. 
Inglehart’s (1977) central thesis is that there has been a silent counter revolution happening in 
modern advanced democracies, that started at the end of World War II. He argues that the 
period following the end of World War II produced unprecedent economic and material 
growth in economically advanced countries. Furthermore, most of these economically 
advanced countries developed broad welfare states that guaranteed a safety net for their 
citizens. This, coupled with the absence of large-scale intercontinental warfare between the 
world’s military superpowers, meant that people born in this period no longer had to fear for 
their existence, in the way that their forefathers had to. These societal changes led to a 
cultural evolution, and a change from what Inglehart (2018) calls materialist values to post-
material values. Materialist values can be seen almost as survivalist values, values that 
prioritize economic and physical safety. Whereas post-material values are self-expressionist, 
meaning they can be seen as a broadening of thinking, from concerns of one’s own physical 
and economical safety to thinking more broadly about questions such as “what kind of 
society do I want to live in”. For example, issues such as gender equality, sexual liberation, 
immigration, democratic values and so forth were now issues that moved to the top of many 
people’s agenda. This led to, as Inglehart argues, massive cultural changes which again led to 
social and political changes. Ignazi (1992) argued that these changes led to a counter 
revolution by people whose moral values were more traditional and conservative. In, 
summary what these modernization theorists argue is that these new developments and 
changes that economically advanced countries were experiencing led to what Minkenberg 
(2000) argued was an establishment of new cleavage structures. Minkenberg (2000, 181) 
argues that “new developments such as globalization, international migration and the end of 
the cold war and state socialism in Eastern Europe resulted in a process of fragmentation in 
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Western democracies”. The theoretical argument that these theories promote is that losers of 
this process of modernization were more prone to vote for a far right party, and since large 
parts of economically advanced countries had experienced such societal changes, this led to 
the emergence of a new party family on the far right of the political spectrum.  
 
The theories explaining far-right support labelled by Golder (2016) as economic and cultural 
grievances are to a certain degree theoretically linked to each other. The economic grievances 
theory hypothesizes that in economically challenged times people are more likely to vote for 
far right parties. This is because far right parties can capitalize on economically troubling 
times by linking for example immigration with expenditure, thus putting an in-group up 
against an out-group. The in-group in this example would be the typical far right voter. 
Several scholars have found that the typical far right voter is “a young male, with a low level 
of education, who is either unemployed, self-employed, or a manual worker” (Golder 2016). 
The typical far right voter would often find himself, or at least imagine himself, to be in 
direct competition with an immigrant, either for a job or for social benefits. The far right 
party can thus put these two groups up against each other, blaming the immigrant for the 
reasons as to why the lowly educated young male is unemployed. However, the studies 
linking far right support with economic grievance theories are a mixed bag, the following 
includes some examples of this. Jackman and Volpert (1996) found support for the economic 
grievance theory, arguing that “higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable 
environment for these political movements”. However, both Knigge (1998) and Arzheimer 
and Carter (2006) found the reverse to be true, that higher unemployment rates actually lead 
to lower levels of far right support.  
 
The studies researching whether cultural grievances influence far right support usually do so 
by operationalizing cultural grievances as anti-immigration sentiments. The theoretical 
implications of the cultural grievance theory are that far right parties mobilize supporters by 
arguing that immigrants bring with them cultural norms and values that are incompatible with 
the native population. Anti-immigration sentiments and support for far right parties have been 
thoroughly researched, and several scholars have found compelling evidence supporting the 
relationship between anti-immigrant sentiments on an individual level leading to electoral 
support for far right parties. Ivarsflaten (2008, 3) found support for this theory, writing that 
“no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing 
grievances over immigration”. Rydgren (2008, 737) had similar findings, arguing that far 
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right parties who link “immigration to criminality and social unrest are particularly effective 
for mobilising voter support”.  
Supply-side explanations 
While the second wave of scholarly research into the far right generally focused on demand-
side explanations, the third wave focused more on supply-side explanations. Supply-side 
explanations have generally focused on the political opportunity structure that these parties 
find themselves in, the organizational structure and strength of the parties themselves and 
finally the ideological formula that makes them appealing.   
 
The political opportunity structures that these parties find themselves in are composed of 
several factors. Golder (2016) highlights “the electoral rules, the nature of the party 
competition, the media, and its political cleavage structure” as the most important supply-side 
factors. The electoral rules refer to the institutional factors, most typically the election 
system, that shape the competition between parties. Several scholars have used Duverger’s 
(1954) thesis about the electoral systems impact on the political systems as a background for 
their own research. Duverger famously argued that majoritarian electoral systems create 
political systems dominated by two parties, while proportional electoral systems create multi-
party systems. The theoretical implications of Duverger’s theory when it comes to the far 
right, is whether electoral systems and party systems affect the electoral support and success 
for these kinds of parties. The general implication being that majoritarian electoral systems 
make it harder for far right parties to have electoral success, while proportional electoral 
systems imply the opposite. Several scholars have found support for this thesis, one example 
is Veugelers and Magnan (2005, 855) who found that support for the far right “tended to be 
higher in countries with systems that were more proportional”. If this theory is correct, the 
proportional electoral system in Norway would be considered an important factor for the 
electoral breakthrough of the FrP.  
 
The policy space and competition with other parties are also seen by several scholars as 
important factors for far right success. Regarding policy space, Kitschelt (1997) famously 
argued that it was easier for far right parties to experience electoral success, if the mainstream 
parties converged to the center of the policy space. The argument goes, that this in turn opens 
up room for a far right party on the ideological fringes of the policy space. Furthermore, it 
also gives wood to the populist fire, because these far right parties can now claim that the 
mainstream parties are colluding in an effort to keep power between themselves.  
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The theories surrounding political cleavage structures generally focus on how these have 
changed, either by the emergence of new cleavages or because the relevance and strength of 
the existing cleavages have been reduced. These theories are closely related to the theories of 
dealignment and realignment processes in European party politics. Dalton et al. (1984) were 
some of the first scholars to write extensively about this topic. They witnessed that Rokkan’s 
freezing hypothesis were under threat due to increasing voter volatility and party 
fractionalization in Western Europe.  
 
Van der Brug and Rekker (2021, 777) define dealignment as a change in “the stable and long-
term factors that used to be important as determinants of party choice” and that these factors 
“have lost their relevance and are not being replaced by other stable long-term predictors”. 
These long-term factors they speak of are closely related to political cleavages such as 
religion, social classes or the economical left-right cleavage. In practice, what dealignment 
often refers to is the process of people no longer feeling aligned with a particular party, 
therefore, they have become de-aligned. Realignment, on the other hand, refers to changes to 
party identification, for example a massive shift in party affiliation, therefore it also refers to 
a change in voter behaviour. Van der Brug and Rekker (2021, 777) argues that realignment 
has happened when “long-term and stable determinants of the vote are losing their ability to 
create stable connections between parties and voters, and are being replaced by other stable 
factors that connect (groups of) voters to parties”. This definition is line with Dalton et al. 
(1984, 13) who defined realignment as the process were people who had lost affiliation with 
a party now found affiliation with a new party. In short, realignment is when people who 
were previously dealigned, find a new party to identify with, thereby becoming aligned again.  
 
The theoretical question that dealignment and realignment theories ask in regard to the 
emergence of the far right is whether the emergence of this party family is, at least in part, a 
result of these processes. Several scholars have argued along the lines of dealignment and 
realignment theories, for example, both Ignazi (1992) and Inglehart (1977) argue that the 
historic cleavages that had dominated western European politics were reduced in strength and 
relevance, and thus new issues rose above these cleavages for a lot of people, causing them to 
vote for new parties.  
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The party itself, its organization and ideology, is also highlighted in the literature as an 
important factor for electoral success. Several scholars point to the importance of having a 
strong party organization and a winning ideological formula in order to be electorally 
successful. When it comes to party organization, Golder (2016) writes that a party may be 
able to overcome obstacles and take advantage of the political opportunity structure presented 
to them, if a party has a strong party organization that is able to exploit such structures. 
Political opportunity structures change depending on the context, meaning that the 
opportunity structures the FrP faces in Norway are somewhat different to what the Sweden 
Democrats may face in Sweden. Factors that influence the political opportunity structures are 
many, but party system, electoral system and the ideological policy space available are all 
factors that influence the electoral success of political parties. However, political opportunity 
structures are something that all parties must deal with, and the literature that focus on the 
organizational strength of a political party, emphasize that the stronger a party is when it 
comes to organizational factors, the better equipped they are at exploiting the political 
opportunity structure that is presented to them. Tavits (2012, 83) writes that “organizational 
strength is defined as extensive network of branch offices, large membership, and 
professional staff”. Tavits studied parties in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Poland, and found that the electoral success of parties from these countries was highly 
dependent on their organizational strength. In other words, parties that were organizationally 
strong were steady when it came to electoral success. Golder (2016) highlights that a strong 
party organization helps a party in many ways, from recruiting activists that help mobilizing 
voters, to the local branches that bring visibility in election campaigns and building a 
professional party organization with competent staff that gives the party a professional and 
reliable image. When it comes to the FrP, it can be argued that much of their survival and 
steady electoral success under leader Carl I. Hagen can be attributed to his organizational 
evolution of the party. Before Hagen assumed leadership, the party was loosely organized, 
and on the fringes of Norwegian politics. When he took over, he built up the party 
organization, and this has definitely been an important factor for their sustained electoral 
success and survival. The organizational strength of the FrP and its effect on the party’s 
survival and success is something I will address in more detail in chapter 5.    
 
A winning ideological formula is also important for electoral success. Without ideological 
appeal, it would be hard to attract voters, as much can be said about almost every political 
party. When it comes to the far right, Kitschelt (1997), Rydgren (2005) and de Lange (2007) 
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have all argued that the electoral success of this new party family is down, at least partly, to 
these parties adoption of a winning ideological formula. The winning formula that these far 
right parties adopted, according to Kitschelt, was an ideological combination of neo-liberal 
economic policies and an authoritarian stance on moral and traditional value laden issues. 
When it comes to the Norwegian Progress Party, they certainly fit at least the first part of 
Kitschelt’s winning formula, as there is no doubt that part of their electoral appeal has been 
their neo-liberal stance on economic policy. However, I would be doubtful to label the FrP as 
authoritarian when it comes to social policies. The question of whether the FrP can be 
labelled as authoritarian, and what kind of authoritarianism the party espouses, will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters that deal with authoritarianism. However, I will reveal as 
much that my analysis does find the FrP to be authoritarian, but not when it comes to moral 
and traditional values. De Lange (2007) updated Kitschelt’s winning formula and argued that 
the ideological appeal of these new far right parties was now down to a centrist position on 
economic policy, rather than the earlier neo-liberal version that Kitschelt argued. De Lange 
argued her position by focusing on three cases, the French Front National, the Dutch Pim 
Fortuyn List, and the Belgian Flemish Block. By focusing on these three cases of far right 
parties, de Lange argued that far right parties after the millennium took a centrist position, 
rather than the earlier neo-liberal position they had taken on economic policy. The last 
argument of a winning ideological formula that I want to include is Rydgren’s (2005) model 
of a new master frame. The new master frame that Rydgren presents is covered extensively in 
chapter three. However, a short introduction will be given here. Rydgren argues that parts of 
the electoral success, and appeal, of the new far right parties that have emerged in the post-
World War II era can be explained by these parties’ adoption of a new master frame. This 
new master frame is a combination of ethno-pluralism and populism. In contrast to Kitschelt 
and de Lange, Rydgren’s winning formula does not include economic policy.  
 
How to conceptualize the populist radical right party family 
Since a large part of this thesis is dedicated to the conceptual nature of the populist radical 
right party family, there need to be some clarification as to what a party family is supposed to 
mean, how they usually are conceptualized and how I have done it. Therefore, this section is 
dedicated to the topic of party families, and it will aim at clarifying three things. Firstly, I will 
look at how party families traditionally have been defined and conceptualized. Secondly, I 
will show that this traditional way of defining party families is not very well suited for some 
populist radical right parties, especially the FrP. Third, and finally, using Muddes (2007) 
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framework as a basis, I will show how the populist radical right has been conceptualized as a 
party family and also explain how this party family is conceptualized in my thesis.  
 
Traditionally party families have been conceptualized by the use of four features, (1) party 
name, (2) transnational linkage, (3) historical origin and (4) ideology (Mair and Mudde 
1998). These four features are often not enough on their own to decide whether a political 
party fits into a party family. Therefore, scholars most often use a combination of some of 
these features, if not all of them.  
 
The first strategy, using party names as an identifying feature of a party family is fairly 
superficial, however, it often proves useful. Mair and Mudde (1998) argues that the use of 
party names as a tool for classification assumes that parties themselves are the best judges of 
their own ideological identity, and this identity will then be reflected in the party name. The 
party’s name can thus be used to identify which family the party belongs to. Jungar and 
Jupskås (2014) argues along the same lines and writes that party names can be highly useful 
for classifying political parties because they often reflect core ideological features or 
concepts of a party. Party names can thus work as associative tools for voters. This means 
that party names often work as a guidance tool for voters, enabling them to identify a party 
on a superficial level based on a political party’s name. For example, many western European 
Social Democratic Labour Parties can be identified by the appearance of words like “labour”, 
“workers” or “social democratic” in the official party name. Examples of such parties include 
the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Worker’s Party. Many populist 
radical right parties also share some similarities when it comes to their party names. For 
example, Jungar and Jupskås highlights that many PRRPs often use names that have slightly 
nativist or populist sentiments in their name, in the sense that they often choose names that 
highlight that they are the party for “the people” or the native group of a country. For 
example, the Finnish and Swedish populist radical right parties use their countries native 
group in their party name, naming their parties “the True Finns” and “the Swedish 
Democrats”. While the Danish PRRP, “the Danish People’s Party”, uses both nativist and 
populist sentiments in their party name.  
 
Transnational linkage, or international cooperation, is also a strategy that is often used to 
classify parties into a party family. Many political parties have ties to “sister-parties” in other 
countries. These ties are often struck because of some sort of ideological similarity. These 
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ties, or links, can be either informal or formal. Jungar and Jupskås (2014, 218) writes that 
informal links can be “informal and sporadic contact such as mutual party recognition, visits 
to each other’s party congresses and support in relation to election campaigns” whereas 
formal links would constitute “formalized collaboration within various supranational bodies” 
(Jungar and Jupskås 2014, 218). Many political parties have formalized their collaboration 
within the European Union, and the political groups that have formed in the European 
Parliament. The European Union parliamentary group “Identity and Democracy”, which are 
made up by parties from the far right, are an example of such a formal link between political 
parties.  
 
Many scholars have also used historical origin as an indicator for grouping political parties 
together in party families. Mair and Mudde (1998) argues that this approach started with 
Rokkan’s (1970) influential work on historical cleavages and its impact on party formation. 
According to Rokkan the national and industrial revolution that happened during the 19th 
century in Western Europe created four historical cleavages that shaped both voting 
behaviour and the pattern of the party systems, those cleavages were (1) state vs church, (2), 
centre vs periphery, (3) owners vs workers and (4) urban vs rural. These cleavage structures 
were also the birth point for many political parties, and researcher have used these theories to 
group political parties together. For example, the owner’s vs workers cleavage has, according 
to this theory, spawned the creation of many labour parties. However, as Mair and Mudde 
(1998) points out, this cleavage theory, and especially Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) hypothesis 
of the freezing of Western European party systems, does not explain the emergence of new 
party families. When it comes to the emergence of the far right, and in particular the populist 
radical right, there are some that have argued that a new cleavage has emerged, a post-
materialist vs materialist cleavage. This is where scholars such as Inglehart (1977) and 
Dalton et.al (1984) come in, as they explain, at least in part, that the emergence of these new 
party families in Western Europe is a result of modernization and the dealignment and 
realignment processes that have taken place.  
  
The fourth criteria, and I would argue the most important, is party ideology. Political parties 
in the same party family always share some core ideological features. By using party 
ideology as the basis for classification, scholars place parties that are ideologically similar 
together in the same party family. Measuring ideological convergence can be done in a 
number of different ways, some of the most used methods according to Mair and Mudde 
 21 
(1998, 217) include “expert judgments, legislative behavior, mass survey data, and formal 
policy statements”. Another popular way of measuring ideological convergence cross 
nationally is by using expert surveys or studies, like the Manifesto Project. The Manifesto 
Project is a database that uses quantitative content analysis to analyse political parties’ 
manifestos and election programmes so that they can be analysed cross nationally. Another 
way of doing this is by doing a qualitative content analysis by yourself, looking for 
ideological features in official party literature, like political action programs, manifestos and 
websites. This is the method that I have chosen, and the method that Mudde (2007) uses 
when he classifies political parties.  
 
The three first criterions used for classifying political parties into party families are however 
difficult to use when it comes to the Norwegian Progress Party. I believe that these three 
criterions are best used as indicators of whether a party belongs to a particular party family. 
When it comes to using party names for classification it is a highly superficial tool. Although 
there are several parties whose party name share some of the same features, there will be 
outliers. Furthermore, I do not believe party name to be anything other than an indicator, and 
parties should thus not be excluded from belonging in a party family, on the basis of their 
name. When it comes to transnational linkage and cooperation, they are often, but not always, 
very good indicators of whether parties belong together in the same family. Parties who have 
transnational links and who cooperate in supranational bodies, like the EU, are likely to share 
some core ideological features, and can often be placed in the same family. However, 
transnational linkage and cooperation is a difficult indicator to use when it comes to the FrP 
for a couple of reasons. Firstly, since Norway is not a member of the European Union, the 
FrP has not been forced into transnational cooperation, as they would have if they were 
elected to the European Parliament, and thus would join a parliamentary group. Secondly, the 
Norwegian Progress Party has routinely denied cooperating with other far right and populist 
radical right parties. This may be down to a number of reasons; however, I believe that this is 
mainly down to the fact that by distancing themselves from these parties, the FrP does not 
have to comment or defend the actions these other parties undertake. A glaring example of 
this happened during the election campaign of 1997, when the leader of Front National, Jean-
Marie Le Pen praised the FrP and wished them good luck in the upcoming general election. 
Carl I. Hagen responded publicly to this, on live TV, and denied any affiliation with Front 
National. Ringheim (2016, 146-147), who recites this episode in his book, argues that this 
was a conscious decision and strategy Hagen took, choosing to distance himself from the 
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Front National and other right-wing extremist parties and leaders in Europe. The distancing 
strategy that Hagen and the FrP took may be because of ideological differences, but it may 
also be because the FrP then does not have to answer for actions taken by other right-wing 
parties.  
 
Historical origin, the third criterion, is hard to use when it comes to new party families, 
because the tradition of using this to classify party families is deeply rooted to the tradition of 
historical cleavage structures. Since these historical cleavages does not encapsulate the 
development of society and politics in Western Europe during the latter part of the 20th 
century, it makes historical origin hard to use as anything other than an indicator for 
membership to a party family. And it is even harder to use this for new parties and party 
families. I have thus chosen, and will argue, that the final criterion of ideology is the best one 
to use for classifying whether a party belongs to a particular party family. Even though a 
political party shared all of the aforementioned indicators, party name, transnational linkage 
and historical origin, it would not matter much if that party diverged from the others when it 
came to ideological features. I strongly believe that ideological content is the most important 
factor in classifying political parties. I have thus decided to focus exclusively on this factor in 
my analysis of whether or not the FrP should be considered as a member of the populist 




Chapter 3 - Defining and operationalizing the Populist Radical 
Right Party 
 
Chapter one aimed at doing two things. The first was to explain the theoretical explanations 
for the emergence of the far right, while also establishing the difference between the radical 
and the extreme right. The second was to explain how party families usually have been 
conceptualized. This chapter, however, is dedicated to defining, conceptualizing and 
operationalizing the electorally most successful party family of the far right, the populist 
radical right. The populist radical right was conceptualized by Mudde (2007) as sharing the 
core ideological features of authoritarianism, nativism and populism. This chapter is 
dedicated to explaining, critically discussing and further expanding on his conceptualization 
of the populist radical right.  
 
The chapter is structured according to the defining features of the populist radical right, this 
means that I will be going through each of these features in turn. This chapter is structured in 
three parts corresponding to the three ideological features of this party family, (1) 
authoritarianism, (2) nativism and (3) populism. In these three parts I will firstly explain how 
Mudde (2007; 2017) defines these features. Then I will discuss his definitions before I move 
on to the final part, which is how I have operationalized these features. There will be some 
slight changes to some of these features, as there are some parts of Muddes original 
definitions that I disagree with him upon. But in general I agree with him that 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism are the defining features of the populist radical right. 
My disagrement is more about how these terms are operationalized and measured.  
 
Authoritarianism 
The classical understanding of the term authoritarianism in the field of political science 
usually refers to some sort of undemocratic and authoritarian regime or ideology. However, 
when it comes to the populist radical right, it refers to something quite different, and not 
necessarily undemocratic at all. The authoritarianism of the populist radical right refers to 
these parties’ belief in a strict and orderly society, and how such a society is to be achieved 
(Mudde 2007). Therefore, as Mudde (2007) argues, authoritarianism is in this context to be 
understood as the ideological conviction that societies rules and laws should be strict in order 
to achieve an orderly society, and violations of these rules should be severally punished. The 
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authoritarianism of the populist radical right thus most often manifests itself in their view that 
criminal activity and criminals should be punished more harshly than they are today.  
 
Mudde (2007) arrived at his definition of authoritarianism heavily inspired by the research 
tradition of the psychological personality traits of the authoritarian personality, developed by 
scholars such as Theodor W. Adorno (Adorno, et al. 1950)  and Bob Altemeyer (1981). The 
emergence and development of this research tradition was heavily inspired by the historical 
events of the 1930s and 40s, when several governments in Europe, in particular Nazi-
Germany and Fascist Italy, were controlled by authoritarian leaders, as well as World War II 
and the Holocaust. Scholars were academically intrigued by the question as to why people 
were being submissive and, in some instances, even supportive towards anti-democratic, 
authoritarian and racist leaders. This lead researcher such as Adorno et al. (1950) and later 
Altemeyer (1981) to develop their theory as to what personality traits are common among 
people who follow authoritarians.  
 
The original theory of the authoritarian personality was developed by Adorno and his fellow 
researchers at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1950 they published The 
Authoritarian Personality. In this book they outline the personality traits that defined a 
person that were theoretically prone to have authoritarian personality traits. Adorno and his 
colleagues theorized that it was a combination of nine variables that made up what they 
argued was the personality traits of an authoritarian. Altemeyer (1981) inspired by Adorno, 
refined the theory of the authoritarian personality and developed his own way of measuring 
this through what is now known as the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA-Scale). 
Altemeyer researched Adorno’s nine variables, using questionnaires and doing a statistical 
analysis, finding that only three of the original nine variables correlated with the personality 
traits of an authoritarian. Altemeyer (2006) explains that the followers of authoritarians 
typically have three personality traits in common: (1) a high degree of submission towards 
authoritarians, (2) a high degree of authoritarian aggression, and finally (3) high levels of 
conventionalism. On the basis of these three variables, Carter (2018, 169) writes that 
Altemeyer was able to show that a person who displayed authoritarian personality traits 
“adheres to traditional values, submits to authority and to the social norms that these 
authorities endorse, and condemns those who violate these norms and values”. Inspired by 
the psychological profiles of the authoritarian personality traits, and especially by the works 
of Altemeyer and Adorno and his colleagues, Mudde (2007) developed his own definition of 
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how authoritarianism manifests itself in populist radical right parties. Mudde (2007, 23) 
defines authoritarianism as “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of 
authority are to be punished severely”. Thus, authoritarianism often manifests itself in these 
parties’ pursuit of policy changes that seek to strengthen law and order policies 
 
Although one might primarily associate populist radical right parties as first and foremost 
anti-immigration parties, several scholars also highlight these parties’ promotion of 
authoritarian policies as a part of their electoral appeal. However, the authoritarianism of 
these parties can also be closely linked to their anti-immigration policy. For example, 
Akkerman and de Lange (2012) noted that these parties’ authoritarian stance on law-and-
order policies sometimes works as an extension of their view on immigration. Populist 
radical right parties often argue that there is a casual link between high levels of immigration 
and crime and terror. Akkerman and de Lange argue that many of these parties adopt 
authoritarian positions because their stances on tougher “law and order” policy goes well 
with their tough stance on immigration, because immigration is closely linked with crime and 
terror in their eyes. Muis and Immerzeel (2017) expand on the general understanding of the 
authoritarianism of these parties, writing that it also encompasses themes that are usually 
regarded as conservative, namely promoting a return to traditional values. Rydgren (2018) 
argues that it is not only these parties’ position on socio-economic issues that place them on 
the right, he argues that these parties’ emphasis on traditional family values also puts them on 
the right of the political spectrum. In summary, this means that parties belonging to the 
populist radical right often takes rightist position on both value laden issues, such as abortion 
laws, marriage rights, and what would be considered conservative family values. However, 
they are also placed on the right because of their conservative stance on law-and-order 
policies and immigration.  
 
Although the populist radical right is arguably the most studied party family of the last couple 
of decades, Carter (2005) argues that the authoritarian part of these parties has received little 
scholarly attention. She questions whether authoritarianism is really a central feature of all far 
right parties, because the term authoritarianism is not fully explained and unpacked in many 
of these studies. Furthermore, she argues that many do not do a good enough job of 
explaining what “authoritarian party ideology” entails. This is because, she argues, that the 
majority of the literature on authoritarianism concerns itself not with the authoritarian 
ideology of the far right, but rather with authoritarianism as a type of political regime. 
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Carter’s critique of the scholarly focus on the authoritarian aspect of the far right takes a two-
headed approach. Firstly, she critiques the scholarly community for not dedicating enough 
focus into studying the authoritarian aspects of these parties, and secondly, she argues that 
the term has not been sufficiently explained and defined as a party ideology. I do agree with 
her on the first point, but not on the second. On the first point, I find her critique to be 
relevant, as there seems to be a plethora of studies investigating the nativist and populist 
aspects of the far right. However, the same focus does not seem to be given to the 
authoritarian aspect of these parties. It is hard to say why that is. One explanation might be 
that the authoritarianism of these parties is closely linked to the nativist feature of these 
parties, in particular their promotion of anti-immigration policies. Scholars should take note 
of this and dedicate more focus to unpacking and researching the authoritarianism of populist 
radical right parties. On the second part however, I disagree somewhat. Several scholars, in 
particular Mudde (2007), have done a good job of both defining the concept as well as 
explaining how the authoritarian aspect of these parties manifests itself. However, in this 
thesis I seek to remedy parts of Carter’s concern, by closely defining and operationalizing 
authoritarianism, as well as carefully researching the authoritarian features of the FrP. The 
next part of my thesis will deal with this in more detail, as I thoroughly explain how I have 
operationalized authoritarianism.   
 
Operationalizing authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism in this thesis is to be understood how Mudde (2007) defines it, as an 
ideology that believes in a strictly ordered society, and infringement of societies rules should 
be punished harshly. However, in order to be able to measure the authoritarianism of the 
Norwegian Progress Party, it is important to unpack this definition in a clear manner, so that I 
am able to measure this aspect of the populist radical right efficiently. Therefore, this part 
will seek to explain what authoritarianism will look like, so that it becomes abundantly clear 
what statements will be interpreted as authoritarian. To do this I will explain in detail how I 
have operationalized the term, as well as explaining the policy areas in which I expect 
authoritarianism to manifest itself.  
 
I have operationalized authoritarianism along two dimensions, policy initiatives and 
traditional moral values. Authoritarian policy initiatives are policy initiatives that these 
parties promote and seek to make into laws. It is thus policy initiatives that aims at making 
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society more orderly. Authoritarian policies stem from the populist radical rights view on 
freedom and what they considered to be a just society. Mudde (2007, 145) writes that 
freedom, in the eyes of the populist radical right, is based on order. Meaning, that in order for 
freedom to be achieved, society has to be orderly. But how is order achieved according to the 
populist radical right? When it comes to public policy and policy initiatives, the populist 
radical right believes that in order to achieve an orderly society there needs to be more focus 
on strengthening law and order policies. Therefore, these parties often focus on policies that 
would give law and order agencies and institutions more power, this often mean institutions 
like the police force, the judiciary and the prison system. Therefore, I am dedicating much 
focus towards the policy areas that concern themselves with the police force, the judiciary 
and prisons. Examples of manifestations of authoritarianism can be wanting to educate and 
hire more police officers, give harsher sentences for criminal activities, or build more prisons 
in order to have the capacity to carry out these harsher sentences. But it can also manifest 
itself in support for the death-penalty, giving police broader rights to search suspects without 
court orders or even lowering the age of criminal responsibility.  
 
Furthermore, by following the arguments of Adorno, et al. (1950), Altemeyer (1981) and 
Carter (2018) I have also decided to operationalize authoritarianism as containing a moral 
value aspect. Adorno and Altemeyer conceptualized the authoritarian personality, which is an 
individual that follows societies rules, conforms to the laws of the government and social 
norms of society, and strongly rejects and condemns individuals who break societies rules, 
laws and norms. I have thus decided to measure authoritarianism along two dimensions, these 
are authoritarian policy initiatives and authoritarian moral values. Although the strongest 
evidence for authoritarianism would be if the party exhibits both dimensions, I will argue that 
empirical evidence of one of the two aspects of authoritarianism, is enough to consider the 
FrP as being authoritarian. This means that finding evidence one of these dimensions will be 
enough, in this thesis, to conclude that the FrP are in fact authoritarian. I will now go through 




Figure 1: Authoritarianism and its dimensions 
 
Authoritarian policy initiatives 
For most populist radical right parties, the path towards a good society goes through the 
adoption of laws that seek to make society more orderly. The authoritarian aspect of this 
refers to the general idea that people are supposed to follow societies rules, even though they 
might disagree with them. For these parties such laws, or policy initiatives, often involves 
several of the following actions: giving more power to law enforcement agencies and 
officials, punishing criminal activity harsher, focusing on punishing criminals rather than 
rehabilitation them, giving more authority and autonomy to the police force, lowering the age 
of criminal responsibility.  The authoritarian aspect of these policy initiatives stems from the 
way populist radical right actors view human freedom. They strongly believe that societies 
rules need to be followed, and an infringement of these rules needs to be punished harshly so 
that people will think twice about breaking them. Populist radical right actors thus sees laws, 
law enforcement, prisons and the judiciary as important institutions that make sure that 
people adhere to societies rules, and therefore they often seek to strengthen these institutions 
so that they can effectively strike down on “rule breakers”. One of the key areas of policy 
initiatives where authoritarianism manifests itself is the strengthening of the police force. 
Many populist radical right parties argue that there need to be more police in the streets, they 
need to be better equipped to tackle the challenges they face, and they need better training to 
face these challenges. Furthermore, they often argue for greater police autonomy so that the 
police can go after criminals without having to deal with too much “red tape”.  These parties 
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thus often hammer the need for “more police” as the solution for dealing with criminal 
activity. Authoritarian policy initiatives are thus supposed to be understood as those 
initiatives that aim to strengthen the laws that govern society, and those institutions that 
punish those that break these rules.  
 
Authoritarian moral values 
The authoritarian moral values refer to populist radical right actor’s idea that people need to 
conform to societies rules and values in order for society to be orderly. The authoritarian 
ideas of moral values are highly tied to the concept of conventionalism, as well as these 
actors’ belief in order and discipline. Conventionalism, according to Carter (2018, 169), 
manifests itself “in policies that safeguard and promote traditional social norms, values, 
morality, roles and lifestyles”. Conventionalism thus manifests itself in the protection of what 
populist radical right actors deem as societies norms, values and traditions. Carter argues that 
conventionalism is exemplified by these parties’ protection of traditional family values, 
patriarchal structures and often an opposition to LGBT-rights. Examples of conventionalism 
could thus be opposition towards letting gay people getting married, opposition towards 
abortion laws, opposition towards affirmative action policies based on gender, and the 
protection of traditional family values. Those that stray away from the conventional norms 
and values of society would thus be deemed as a threat to the order of society.  
 
Nativism 
Nativism is according to Mudde (2007), the second defining feature of the populist radical 
right. This section aims at explaining what nativism is, as well as reviewing and explaining 
other ideological aspects that are frequently tied to the far right and populist radical right 
parties, which are close to nativism in nature. These other aspects are ethno-pluralism and 
welfare chauvinism. In this thesis I view ethno-pluralism and welfare chauvinism as 
dimensions of nativism, meaning that I look at these two aspects as features where nativism 
manifests. The section is structured in the following way. First, I will explain, in general 
terms, what nativism is. Then I move on to explaining how the ideological features of 
nativism was developed by the Nouvelle Droit in France through the creation of a new master 
frame, a master frame that several far right movements, actors and populist radical right 
parties have copied to great electoral success.  
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Nativism and its exclusionary nature 
Mudde (2007, 19) argues that nativism is closely related to nationalism and xenophobia, and 
defines it as: “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) 
are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state”. Nativists will thus argue that 
a state should be inhabited by that state’s native population, and that non-native elements are 
a threat to the state. Non-native people are often defined by either culture, nationality, race, 
religion or ethnicity. However, non-native elements do not necessarily have to be people, it 
can also refer to other elements in society that are deemed threatening to the state. For 
example, many anti-immigrants will argue that immigration is a threat to the cultural identity 
and values of their country, in this context immigrants are seen as a non-native threatening 
element. However, the new culture that these immigrants are perceived as bringing with them 
are also seen as a non-native element, that is threatening their homogenous nation state.  
 
Betz (2017) however argues that nativism is different in Latin-America and Europe, he 
argues that populist leaders in Latin-America use nativism in an “inclusive” manner in order 
to mobilize people by populist measures. In Europe, on the other hand, populist leaders have 
used nativism in an “exclusive” manner, in order to mobilize people. Filc (2015) writes that 
Latin-American populists have used exclusionary nativist and populist tactics to include 
social groups that have been excluded in the past. The inclusive nature that populism and 
nativism has taken in Latin-America has thus been a strategy these movements have 
strategically taken to enlarge their electoral support. In Europe however, populist leaders and 
movements have chosen an exclusive version of nativism, as defined by Mudde (2007), and 
often employing what Rydgren (2005) has defined as the new master frame.  
 
The new master frame of the far right 
Rydgren (2005) explains that the electoral success of this new party family is best described 
by the development of a new master frame, that combines ethno-pluralism and populism. 
According to Rydgren the old master frame, which was employed by the extreme right of the 
World War II era, was a combination of biologically based racism, antisemitism and overt 
anti-democratic sentiments. However, this old master frame was rendered useless in the post-
World War II era, and the new radical right parties that emerged in this period and later, 
realised that this old master frame would not translate to anything other than marginal 
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electoral support. Therefore, a new master frame was needed. The development of this new 
master frame is usually attributed to the Nouevelle Droite (New Right) movement that 
emerged in France in the late 1960s. The Nouvelle Droite was according to Bar-On (2011, 
199) “a cultural school of thought”, that reformed the discourse of the extreme right-wing 
political parties and made it more politically correct. The old master frame was used by both 
the Nazis and Fascists in Germany and Italy, and anything that was associated with those 
movements and parties were highly stigmatized. The Nouvelle Droite movement understood 
this and figured out that if far right parties were to be electorally successful, they had to 
distance themselves from the old far right and their master frame, and thus searched to 
develop a new and potent master frame. The new master frame that they developed thus had 
to achieve two things, it had to have some distance to the old master frame employed by the 
Nazi and Fascist parties, and it had to redevelop, or repackage, a political message that 
people could vote for.  
 
The new master frame that the Nouvelle Droit developed achieved both goals. Ideologically, 
this new master frame was a combination of ethno-pluralism and populism. Ethno-pluralism 
is according to Rydgren (2005) “based on cultural racism”, rather than the biological racism 
of the old master frame. Whereas biological racism is a doctrine that views other ethnic 
groups then one’s own as inferior, ethno-pluralism views every culture, ethnicity or race as 
equal but incompatible with each other. This means that proponents of ethno-pluralism do not 
view other cultures, ethnicities or races as inferior, what they instead believe is that they 
cannot coexist together. Multi-culturalism is thus considered as a threat to the state, because 
different cultures are viewed as incompatible, and would thus lead to social unrest. Golder 
(2016) argues that the goal for the adherents of the ethno-pluralist doctrine is to establish an 
ethnocracy, which is a sort of ethnic democracy that prioritizes its own people. Furthermore, 
Golder writes that the world is envisioned as culturally diverse, however nation states should 
be monocultural.  
 
By arguing that different people, cultures and races are equal, but incompatible, the New 
Right has been able to distance themselves from the Old Right and their doctrine of 
biological racism, and therefore also from the claims that the New Right itself is racist. 
Although the populism of the new right and the populist radical right will be thoroughly 
reviewed and explained in the next section, a few sentences on the topic merits attention at 
this point. The importance of populism in the context of the New Master frame is that the 
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Nouvelle Droit focused their attention on a populist message of anti-establishment. This anti-
establishment critique of the new master frame contrasted with the overt anti-democratic 
message of the old master frame employed by the old extreme right. The New Rights focus 
on ethno-pluralism and populism instead of biological racism and an anti-democratic 
discourse meant that they managed to distance themselves from the old right. This new 
formula would soon merit electoral success.  
 
The definite breakthrough of the new master frame was, according to Rydgren (2005), the 
electoral success of the French Front National in 1984. Front Nationals’ electoral 
breakthrough and success signalled to other far right parties that this new master frame was 
successful in gaining electoral support. Rydgren (2005) argues that the electoral success of 
Front national in 1984 started a process of cross-national diffusion. In other words, other far 
right parties and actors started copying this new master frame, and its message of ethno-
pluralism and populism.  
 
The development and employment of welfare chauvinism 
Another feature of nativism that many far right and populist radical right parties use as a 
rhetorical approach and as basis for their policy choices is welfare chauvinism. Welfare 
chauvinism was first used, and popularized, by Ghoul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) in 
their article about the Norwegian and Danish progress parties. They write that welfare 
chauvinism is the belief that “welfare services should be restricted to our own” (Goul 
Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, 212). Our own, in this context, is referring to the native 
population of a nation-state. Welfare chauvinists will argue that the native population of a 
nation-state should be prioritized before any other group, especially non-native groups and 
immigrants. Ghoul Andersen and Bjørklund argued that welfare chauvinism was a central 
feature for the support of the Norwegian Progress Party. They theorized that many of the 
FrPs voters came from the working class, a group which was reliant on welfare goods, and 
thus felt threatened by the increase in immigration. According to this theory, many belonging 
to the working class thus started voting for the FrP, because they saw the party as protecting 
them and their access to welfare goods and services. The working class wanted to limit the 
extension of welfare goods, so that the native population of Norway, meaning themselves, 




In this thesis I will argue that nativism in the context of Western Europe is best 
conceptualized as an ideology that combines the features of exclusionary ethno-pluralism and 
welfare chauvinism. It is by these two features, or dimensions, that I expect nativism to 
manifest itself. In this section I will explain how I have operationalized and measured these 
two features. However, although I consider nativism as often manifesting themselves along 
these two features, strong evidential support of only one of these features will be considered 
enough for labelling the FrP as nativist. For example, if I find strong empirical support for 
welfare chauvinist policies in official FrP documents, but no evidence of ethno-pluralism, I 
will conclude that they should be considered nativist. However, I would note, that the 
strongest support for nativism will be found if both boxes are checked, meaning, that I find 
support for both dimensions.  
 
 




The exclusionary nature of the nativist arguments that populist radical right parties espouse 
stems from their belief in a homogeneous and monocultural society. Mudde (2007, 138) 
writes that while their ultimate dream society would be a homogenous monocultural nation 
state, this is a utopian dream, therefore many populist radical right parties strive for what is 
considered by them a more attainable alternative, that is an ethnocratic state. Exclusionary 
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nativist arguments would be those arguments that seek to exclude other non-native elements 
from the nation state. Examples of exclusionary ethno-pluralist arguments, according to 
Mudde (2007, 139), include the British National Fronts slogan “Britain for the British”, the 
Bulgarian Ataka “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians”, and the Dutch Center Party 86s slogan 
“Netherlands for the Netherlanders!”. Exclusionary ethno-pluralism is thus most easily 
recognisable by the use of slogans that strongly argues for a homogenous and monocultural 
national state. Such slogans often include the name of the native people, and by interpretation 
they exclude other non-native groups and cultures.  
 
Although such slogans represent the most blatant support for exclusionary ethno-pluralism, 
there are other, more subtler forms that this aspect of nativism can take. Other aspects of 
ethno-pluralism could manifest itself in statements on topics such as: anti-immigration, anti-
Islamism, islamophobia, assimilation policies, citizenship, religion, criminal acts by 
immigrants and culture.  
Welfare chauvinism 
Welfare chauvinism is based on the idea that welfare services should be restricted to a state’s 
native people. In Norway welfare services are distributed evenly and broadly among the 
whole population, arguments that thus seeks to limit certain people from welfare services on 
the basis of their race, nationality or immigrant status will thus be considered as welfare 
chauvinist arguments. Welfare services are to be understood as broad and universal social 
services that the state provides such as education, healthcare, unemployment benefits or 
subsidized housing projects. Examples of welfare chauvinism could thus be arguments or 
policy proposals that seek to limit immigrants’ access to healthcare services.  
 
However, another form of welfare chauvinism, according to Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 
(1990) is opposition to foreign aid. Oppositon towards foreign aid directed at developing 
countries are thus also seen as a form of welfare chauvinism in this thesis. I have named the 
opposition towards using the states resources on foreign aid as external welfare chauvinism, 
while the idea that welfare service should be limited to the native people of a state is called 




Populism is arguably one of the most talked about and research topics in recent times. 
Important events like the Brexit vote in the UK, the presidential election of Donald Trump 
and the emergence of the far right have led to an increased interest and growth in research 
and studies on populism. When it comes to the far right, several scholars agree that populism 
is a central feature of this party family (See Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfal 1998; Mudde 
2007; Taggart 1995). However, there is some disagreement as to what exactly are the central 
features of populism. Some have argued that populism is democratic, others that it is anti-
democratic (Müller 2016). Some highlight the ideological features of populism (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017), while others argue that it is best understood as a discursive style or 
rhetorical approach (Moffitt 2016). Others again argue that populism is a leadership style or 
organizational approach to politics (Weyland 2001). In this thesis however, I have focused on 
three features that I believe best conceptualizes populism, that is the ideological content of 
populism, the leadership style that many populist leaders espouse, and finally populism as a 
rhetorical tool.  
 
By defining populism simply as an ideological feature of these parties, Mudde (2007) 
neglects the rhetorical and leadership components that I believe are central to understanding 
populism as a concept. I disagree with his definition, simply because I do not believe that it 
captures the whole essence of what populism is. Therefore, in this section I will argue that 
populism is best understood as a combination of a thin ideology, a rhetorical approach and a 
leadership style. This section will thus aim to develop a new conceptualization of populism, a 
concept that contains these three features, ideology, a rhetorical approach and a leadership 
style. Secondly, I will explain how I have operationalized the term, so that it is clear what I 









The thin ideology of populism 
Populism is often understood as a thin ideology, what this means is that it has some 
ideological features, but it is not so broad that it offers explanations and solutions for many 
political issues. Mudde (2007) defines populism by focusing on the ideological features of 
populism, and defines populism as the following: 
 
populism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt 
elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) 
of the people (Mudde 2007, 23). 
 
Mudde thus argues that populism is best understood by how populists view society. He 
argues that they view society as a struggle between a “corrupt elite” and “the pure people”, 
and that they themselves are the champion of “the pure people” and the voice of the general 
will. Canovan (1999, 2) argued that populism can thus be “understood as an appeal to `the 
people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values”. 
By Muddes definition, populism is conceptualized as containing three core concepts, “the 
pure people”, “the corrupt elite”, and “the general will” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 9). 
This raises the question of who exactly are “the people”, who are “the corrupt elite”, and 
what is considered as being “the general will”?  
 
When it comes to the question of whom “the pure people” are, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) 
argues along the lines of Anderson (2006). Like Anderson, Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that 
“the people” are an imagined group, a social construction. Since “the pure people” is a social 
construction, it allows for great flexibility, meaning that populists in different settings can 
easily change whom it is that belongs to this group. That is why Canovan (1999) argued that 
populism is context dependent. The context dependency of populism means that populists can 
change their appeal, meaning that whom the “pure people” are, can change depending on the 
contextual surroundings of the populists. In the context of this thesis, this means that a 
populist radical right party can adapt to their contextual surroundings and define what group 
they consider as being “the pure people”.   
 
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) argue that “the pure people” and “corrupt elite” are often 
differentiated on the basis of nationality, socioeconomic class or political power. These 
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groups can also overlap, so that populists can use all three factors to differentiate between 
“the people” and “the elite”. For example, the Sweden Democrats often blame immigration 
and multiculturalism for Sweden’s ailments and problems. One argument the Sweden 
Democrats often use is that regular native Swedes lose out economically on immigration, 
because immigrants who comes to Sweden take their jobs and money from the Swedish 
welfare state, to the detriment of the Swedish working class. They also lay blame on current 
and former Swedish governments for allowing high numbers of immigrants, with cultural 
norms that are far removed and incompatible with Swedish values, entering the country. By 
doing this they define “the pure people” as native Swedes (nationality) belonging to the 
working class (socioeconomic) that have been betrayed by the politicians who hold political 
power over them (political power). This is also a good example of internal welfare chauvinist 
arguments.  
 
“The corrupt elite”, on the other hand, is construed as being an antagonistic group that is in 
direct opposition to “the people”. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) writes that “the corrupt 
elite” is somewhat undertheorized in the scientific literature, however, they argue that this 
group is often made up by the political establishment, the economic elite, the cultural elite 
and the media. Furthermore, they argue that this group “are portrayed as one homogeneous 
corrupt group that works against the “general will” of the people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 
2017, 12). The fundamental distinction between “the people” and “the elite” are made with 
regards to power, those that are construed as belonging to “the elite” is people who have 
power and belong to one of these groups. Those people can be politicians, journalists, 
authors, economists, philanthropists or billionaires. People that hold positions of power in the 
fields of politics, economics, culture or media are then considered being part of “the corrupt 
elite”. A notable of example of how a populist leader construed “the corrupt elite” can be 
found in the United States. Donald Trump regularly blamed the media for spreading “fake 
news”, often blaming them for reporting what he labelled were establishment friendly “fake 
news”. Donald Trump’s hostility towards the media works as a great example of how he 
constructed the media as being part of the corrupt elite.  
 
The final core concept of populism is the general will. Canovan (1999, 2) writes that 
“populists see themselves as true democrats, voicing popular grievances and opinions 
systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media”. Populists thus 
believe that they themselves represents the voice of the people, and thus it is their job to 
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articulate the grievances that “the pure people” have. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 16) argue 
that it is this moral distinction between the “good people” and the “bad and corrupt elite”, 
that serves as the impetus for the idea of the general will. Populist view “the pure people” as 
a homogenous group with common interests, that are being cheated by a “corrupt elite” 
holding power over them. It thus becomes the populist’s mission to express the will of “the 
people”, since this group is oppressed by “the corrupt elite”. Since “the people” is viewed as 
a homogenous group with a common interest, and populist believe that they have identified 
this groups will and interests, they are thus able to argue that the will and interest that they 
articulate, is “the general will”. The idea that “the pure people” is a homogenous group with 
one common interest (the general will) is one of the reasons why populists often champion 
ideas of more direct forms of democracy. Introducing more direct forms of democracy, like 
referendums or citizens initiatives, are seen as actions that give people more power over “the 
corrupt elite”. Therefore, populist parties in Western Europe often promote policy changes 
that take political decision-making processes closer to the people. These policy changes often 
involve the adoption of direct mechanisms for democratic influence, for example plebiscites 
and referendums. There are however some that argue that populism is inherently anti-
democratic, Müller (2016) being one of them. Müller argues that populism is anti-democratic 
because it is anti-liberal, while at the same time rejecting representative democracies ruling 
notion of pluralism. Furthermore, he argues that if populists are given to much power, they 
will create an authoritarian state. I however do not agree with this. Although many populists 
are critical of modern liberal democracies, all populists are not inherently anti-democratic. 
They often seek to reform modern liberal democracies into more direct democracies, but I 
reject the idea of populism as being inherently anti-democratic. I believe it is better to think 
of many populists as democracy reformists. Many populists and populist parties want to 
reform today’s pluralist and representative democracies into more direct democracies, where 
people have more direct influence over the decision-making process in politics. The idea that 
populism is anti-democratic, in my view, stems from Latin-America’s experience with 
authoritarian populist leaders and holds little water in other parts of the world. It is thus 
wrong, in my opinion, to label populism as inherently anti-democratic, although some 
populists clearly have anti-democratic ideals. Populism in this thesis is thus not to be 
understood as an anti-democratic ideology.  
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Populism as a rhetorical tool and leadership style 
While Mudde defines and conceptualizes populism by only focusing on the ideological 
features, there are other scholars that argue that populism entails more than this. There are 
two other approaches to defining populism that deserves to be mentioned. Firstly, many 
scholars argue that populism has a performative aspect, an aspect I have chosen to call the 
rhetorical approach. Secondly, scholars focusing on Latin American politics often argue that 
populism can be conceptualized using an organizational approach. I would argue that these 
two features are of important for understanding populism as a concept, the following section 
thus seeks to explain what these two other aspects of populism looks like.   
 
Many scholars focus on the ideological contents of populism, there are however others who 
conceptualized the topic in another way, Moffit and Brubaker are scholars who focus on 
other aspects than just the ideological content of populism. Moffitt (2016) argues that it is 
important to focus on the rhetorical approach and political style of populism. Brubaker (2017, 
1) also argues that it is important to account for the “discursive and stylistic repertoire” of 
populism. These authors’ focus on populism as a rhetorical approach and political style does 
not however neglect the ideological content of the term. It is better to view it as an expansion 
of a minimal concept. While Mudde (2007) defines the concept in a minimal way, inspired by 
Sartori’s (1970) classification of “minimal concepts”. The approach to view populism as a 
rhetorical approach should thus be seen as a complementary expansion to this definition.  
 
Moffitt (2016, 60) writes that populism should also be understood as a rhetorical approach to 
politics, in which a political leader is viewed as the performer of populism, who will often 
adopt “bad manners to distance themselves from other political actors in terms of legitimacy 
and authenticity, often breaking the unwritten rules about how politicians are ‘supposed’ to 
conduct themselves”. The populist leader thus exhibits bad manners, in order to distance 
him/herself from “the corrupt elite”, who in this context would be other political actors. This 
way of conceptualizing populism is closely related to how Weyland (2001) defines populism 
as a political strategy. Weyland, arriving at his definition from his studies on populism in 
Latin America, argues that populism as a political strategy is aimed mostly at gaining 
political power. The leader is important in this context, because he/she was the one that 
adopted the political strategy aimed at mobilizing the masses for electoral support.  
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Furthermore, Moffitt argues that political leaders that utilizes populisms rhetorical tools, do 
this to distance themselves from other political actors, so that they can claim that they speak 
for “the people”. Therefore, they will utilize what Moffitt calls “bad manners”, which is a 
discursive approach or rhetorical tool that distances them from other political actors. These 
“bad manners” are closely related to what Canovan (1999) labelled “tabloid style” 
communication. Moffitt (2016, 52) explains that “bad manners” may include using “slang, 
swearing, political incorrectness, and being overly demonstrative and ‘colourful’”. The 
rhetorical approach that populism takes should in this thesis be understood as just that, the 
use of “bad manners” and “tabloid style” communications by political actors in order to 
distance themselves from the political elite.  
 
Weyland’s (2001) approach to conceptualizing populism is prevalent among scholars who 
study Latin American politics. Scholars studying populism in Latin America conceptualize it 
as an organizational approach towards politics. Weyland (2001, 14) argues that this approach 
views populism “as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or 
exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from 
large numbers of mostly unorganized follower”. Weyland’s definition of populism is highly 
influenced by his experience and research of populism in Latin America, where many 
populist leaders also ruled autocratically. Notable examples include Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and current Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Weyland’s 
definition thus reflects the autocratic legacy of many populist leaders in Latin America; 
however, I still believe parts of his conceptualization of populism can be useful when 
translated to a European context. In particular, I believe that his approach of viewing 
populism as a political strategy for gaining political power by mobilizing the people easily 
translates. Furthermore, Weyland also views the populist leader as important for mobilizing 
the people, because he is often the one employing the political strategy of populism. Drawing 
inspiration from Weyland’s work I have thus decided to also conceptualize populism as 
having a strategic element to it. However, whereas Weyland focused on one leader, I believe 
that in today’s setting this populist political strategy could be employed by other actors then 
just the leader of a political party. Therefore, I will present the argument that a populist 
political strategy can be exercised by a number of political actors in a political party. 
According to this a leader of a political party can outsource the populist rhetoric to an 
understudy in the party. By doing this, the leader can easily distance himself from the 
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populists in his own party, if their rhetoric backfires, as well as enjoying the benefits if the 
message “hits home”.  
Operationalizing populism 
The previous section explained populism by focusing on three aspects of the term, as a thin 
ideology, as a rhetorical tool and as a leadership style. However, since I have chosen to do a 
qualitative content analysis surveying official party documents, I will be focusing almost 
exclusively on the ideological contents of populism. The reasons behind this have to do with 
the nature of the data I am using and where populism is expected to manifest itself. The 
ideological content of populism will manifest itself in official party literature, if the FrP 
shows itself to be ideologically populistic. However, it will be difficult to find manifestations 
of populism as a rhetorical tool and as a leadership style in party literature. As these 
dimensions of populism arguably manifest itself through performative factors. It will thus be 
hard to find evidence of these two factors in the party literature. Therefore, the qualitative 
content analysis of the party literature will focus on the ideological content of populism. The 
other two factors, the rhetorical tool and leadership style will be discussed when I review 
FrPs history and the main actors that shaped the party’s development, in particular the leaders 
of the party. I will also discuss this issue in the final part of the thesis.  
 
When it comes to populism as an ideology, I have chosen to operationalize this feature along 
two dimensions, and it is along these two dimensions that I expect populism to manifest itself 
in the party literature, if in fact the FrP is populist. These two dimensions are populism’s 
view on democracy and its critique of “the corrupt elite”. The other two aspects of populism, 
the leadership style and rhetorical approach will be dealt with when discussing the history of 
the FrP, but this dimension of populism will be neglected when studying the party literature 




Figure 3: Populism and its main dimensions 
 
Democracy reforms 
As populism entails viewing society as divided into two antagonistic groups, “the pure 
people” and “the corrupt elite”, populists often seek to give more power to the people. The 
dimension of democracy reforms seeks to measure populism according to this. According to 
Mudde (2007, 151) populists view modern representative democracy as not being 
democratic, because political elites “controls all power through the system of representative 
government and the practice of cartelization”. And it is through the implementation of 
measures of plebiscitary democracy, that people can take back power from the corrupt elite. 
Therefore, when I look through the official party literature of the FrP, their website and their 
political manifestos, I will be looking for signs of democracy reform in the form of 
plebiscitarianism, meaning policy initiatives that seeks to give the people more direct access 
to democratic decision makings processes.  
 
Often this means that populists promote the idea of giving people more responsibility in the 
form of referendums. Populist radical right parties often promote more frequent use of 
referendums (Mudde 2007, 152). According to Mudde (2007, 155), these parties see 
referendums as a way to “weaken political parties and fragment party systems, thus 
undermining key institutions of contemporary democracies”. Therefore, I will look at the 
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FrPs position on referendums. Other measures that populists can undertake to give the people 
more power is through the implementation of more direct decision-making power, such as 
citizens initiatives. A citizen’s initiative is a petition that can either force governments to 
propose a law or force them to vote on a law proposal in parliament, but only if the petition is 
signed by a certain amount of people.  
 
Populism can however also manifest itself other places than just trough policy proposals that 
aim to reform democracies. Therefore, I am also looking for statements that criticize the 
overall democratic system. In particular I am looking for statements that critique the 
Norwegian democratic system and looking to change it more in the form of a direct 
democracy, where citizens have greater control over policy proposals through voting directly 
on them. Statements seeking to reform the Norwegian representative democracy into the 
direction of direct democracy, through the use of referendums, citizens’ initiative and direct 
vote on policy proposals, will be interpreted as populism.  
 
Elite criticism 
Statements that critique the elite will also be considered as signs of populism. The “corrupt 
elite” can be many groups of people, and in many aspects this dimension of populism is 
highly context specific. However, I do expect some aspect of the elite criticism of populism 
to be fairly universal. It does seem that populist critique of the ruling political elite, the 
media, members of the economic, cultural and academic elite, are often at the centre of elite 
criticism. I will therefore be on the lookout for statements that can be interpreted as critique 
towards groups that can be considered as holding and wielding considerable power. 
However, when a party uses elite criticism as a populist strategy, they often also argue that 
they are the voice of the people, that they embody the general will of “the pure people”. 
Therefore, statements where the FrP presents themselves as the “voice of the people” or “the 
party for the people”, or something along the lines of being the party for the general will of 
the people, will be considered as being populist. Although statements along the lines of being 
the party of people are not directly tied to elite criticism, it is not far removed from the nature 
of elite critical arguments. This is because a central part of the populist strategy of critiquing 
the political power of the elite, stems from a populist actors claim to represent the general 
will of the “pure people”. Therefore, I have included this aspect of elite criticism under this 
dimension of populism.  
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Chapter 4 - Methodological approach and data 
This chapter aims to do three things. Firstly, I will explain the methodological approach that I 
have taken, qualitative content analysis, in order to answer the question of whether or not the 
Norwegian Progress Party is a populist radical right party. I will explain the method and its 
characteristics and why I believe this method to be very well suited for answering my 
research question, and thus why I have chosen this approach. Secondly, I will present and 
explain the data I have used in my analysis, going into what kinds of data I have used, why I 
have chosen this data and how I collected it. And thirdly, in the final part of this chapter, I 
will explain how I went about analysing my data, trough the creation and use of three 
different coding frames, each one covering one of the dimensions of populist radical right, 
i.e., authoritarianism, nativism and populism. These coding frames work as a guiding tool 
when analysing the ideological features of the FrP with regards to the three dimensions of the 
populist radical right.  
Qualitative Content Analysis 
There are many different ways of deciding on a political party’s belonging to a party family. 
Traditionally there are four ways researchers have used to place a political party. (1) 
Ideology, (2) historical origin, (3) party name and (4) transnational cooperation and links are 
the most common factors scholars have used for placing a political party into a party family. 
However, as mentioned earlier, when it comes to the FrP and the populist radical right, all 
factors other than ideology are difficult to use, for various reason. Therefore, I have chosen to 
focus solely on political ideology as the sole factor for considering whether the FrP should be 
included or excluded from the populist radical right.  
 
There are a couple of different methods that I could have used as a measurement of the 
ideology of the FrP. One of the research methods that is much used in comparative political 
research is quantitative content analysis. The Manifesto Project Database (MPD) is a 
database that is often used for comparing and reviewing political manifestos and election 
programmes cross nationally. However, this method has its weaknesses, and it is the 
advantages that the method of qualitative content analysis gives, that led me to choose this 
method. Since I am not interested in directly comparing different political manifestos to each 
other, but more interested in a deep dive into the ideological content of the FrP, I believe that 
qualitative content analysis is more equipped for my purpose.  
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The research method of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) is widely used for determining 
the ideological profile of a political party, and it is exactly this method that Mudde (2007) 
used for classifying different political parties as belonging to the populist radical right party 
family, or not. He writes that this method is especially suited for this purpose because it 
“provides the proximity to the data and flexibility in operationalization necessary for 
studying highly complex concepts such as nativism, authoritarianism, and populism” (Mudde 
2007, 39). The proximity to the data and flexibility are two of the defining features of 
qualitative content analysis and are two crucial factors to why I have chosen this method. 
This method lets me personally dive into the ideological content of the FrP, by closely 
reading and categorizing the ideological content of their political action program, program of 
principles, and website. It also allows for flexibility in the way that I have developed the 
coding frame, dimensions and subcategories for how to measure and code authoritarianism, 
nativism and populism.  
 
At its core qualitative content analysis is used for describing data and its meaning in a 
systematic way. The method goes beyond mere description by also identifying the meaning 
of the data, that is why Schreier (2012) argues that QCA is an ideal research method when 
the material one is analysing needs to be interpreted. I will use a theoretical example to 
highlight this point. When it comes to the FrP it would be hard to find evidence in their 
official party literature that clearly states them as authoritarian, nativist or populist. You 
would be hard-pressed trying to find a statement where the party itself goes out and says, “we 
are a populist radical right party”. Therefore, the researcher has to conceptualize and 
operationalize these topics, interpret the meaning of statements found in the party literature 
and find out if they are in fact any of these things. Interpreting the meaning of the data is thus 
a crucial part of QCA and is part of the reasons as to why I have chosen this method.  
 
Schreier (2014, 170) writes that there are three features that characterizes qualitative content 
analysis, (1) the reduction of data material, (2) its systematic nature and (3) the flexible 
nature of the method. Schreier argues that QCA reduces the data material used because the 
researcher can choose to focus on the aspects that is important to the research question. When 
the researcher develops the coding frame, dimensions and categories, he can choose to focus 
on the aspects he deems important for understanding and answering the overarching research 
topic. In this thesis I have chosen to focus on the three core features of populist radical right 
parties, authoritarianism, nativism and populism, and whether these three aspects can be 
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considered being core ideological features of the FrP. By developing dimensions and 
subcategories of these three ideological features, I can in a more effective way, study the 
parts of my data material that deals more directly with these features. For example, when 
reading the election manifesto of the FrP, I can focus closely on immigration policy, since I 
have identified this as a subcategory/dimension of nativism.  
 
The systematic nature of QCA lays in the methods use of a coding frame and the sequence of 
steps. According to Schreier (2012, 5), the sequence of steps involved with QCA is first to 
decide on a research question, second to find the data material, third to build a coding frame, 
usually with several categories and subsequent subcategories. Then the researcher has to code 
the material, before he tests and revise the coding frame and finally discusses and analyses 
the findings. This sequence of steps is part of what makes QCA systematic. Furthermore, 
Schreier (2014, 172) writes that the use of a coding frame also mitigates the problem of 
different people interpreting the data material differently. In addition, QCA can also be 
considered as being systemic because it requires the researcher to systematically use the 
coding frame when going through the data material, using it almost as a guiding compass for 
what to look after.   
 
Thirdly, the flexibility of the method refers to how QCA needs to be matched to the data 
material that is being used. When developing the coding frame, the researcher needs to take 
the data material into account, he has to make sure that the data material matches the coding 
frame, to a certain degree, so that the coding frame gives a good description of the data and 
the subject that is under investigation. The flexibility of this method also refers to how the 
coding frame can be composed. As I will explain in the next section, the coding frame can be 
produced either deductively or inductively, giving the researcher flexibility when developing 
the coding frame, as well as when coding the material at hand.  
 
Coding frame 
The coding frame is one of the defining features and maybe the most important aspect of 
qualitative content analysis. According to Schreier (2012, 58) the coding frame is “at the 
heart of the method”. The coding frame consists of the main categories, often also called 
dimensions. These dimensions constitute the main aspects that are under investigation. In this 
thesis the dimensions under investigation are authoritarianism, nativism and populism. These 
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dimensions, or main categories, are then further specified by the development of 
subcategories. Subcategories thus works as further specification of the main dimensions. 
Schreier (2012, 60) writes that these subcategories can be developed deductively or 
inductively. Deductively derived subcategories are those that are developed before looking at 
the data material, they are developed by using existing knowledge on the concepts at hand, 
they can therefore also be called concept-driven subcategories. Subcategories that are 
developed inductively are developed by looking at the data, they are therefore data driven. 
My coding frame, the dimensions and subcategories, were developed deductively. In practice, 
this means that I developed my coding frame before I looked at the data material. In my 
thesis the subcategories are the operationalized categories of my main dimensions, that is 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism.  
 
In short then, the coding frame structures the data material because it explains what I am 
looking for in my data material based upon how I have defined and operationalized the main 
aspects of my research question. The coding frame consists of the main dimensions, in my 
thesis that would be the ideological aspects of the populist radical right, meaning 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism. Furthermore, these dimensions are further 
developed into subcategories, each dimension has its own subcategories, which purpose is to 
further develop and specify the meaning of the main dimensions. The subcategories tell 
exactly what it is that I am looking for in my data material. Since the populist radical right is 
conceptualized as being authoritarian, nativist and populist, it is these three things that I am 
looking for in the FrP. Therefore, I have developed three coding frames, one for each 
ideological aspect of the populist radical right. These coding frames highlight what I am 
looking for in the data material and where in the data I am searching. Tables 1, 2 and 3 
contain the coding frames for authoritarianism, nativism and populism. They are structure 
according to the different dimensions of these ideological features, and the policy issues 
where I expect these ideological features to manifest themselves. Using authoritarianism as 
an example, I identified policy initiatives and moral values as dimensions of this features. I 
expect authoritarian policy initiatives to manifest itself in some of the following policy 


































Policy issues – Manifestations of 
authoritarianism 
 
Justice and immigration 
policy 
 
• More resources for 
law enforcement 
agencies.  
• Prison sentences. 
• More resources for 
the police. 
• Age of criminal 
responsibility. 
• Longer prison 
sentences.  
• Harsher punishments 
for criminal activity. 
• More independent 
police.  
• More independent 
judiciary.  
• Citizens right to self-
defence. 
 




• Traditional family 
values 
• Harsher drug policy. 













































Policy issues - Manifestations 
 
 
• Foreign aid 
• Welfare policies 









• Arguing that 






• Criminal immigrants. 
• Stricter immigration 
laws.  







































Policy issues - Manifestations 
 
 
• More use of 
referendums.  
 
• Citizen’s initiative.  
 




• Promoting more direct 
forms of democracy.  
 
 
• Critique of media 
• Critique of the economic 
elite. 
• Critique of academic 
elite. 
• Critique of political elite. 
• Portraying themselves as 
the “party for the people”. 
• Arguing that they 
represent “the general 
will”.  
• General critique of a 













The research question often, at least to a certain extent, dictates what kinds of data one can 
use. The overall question that this thesis aims at answering is whether the Norwegian 
Progress Party should be considered a populist radical right party. There are several measures 
one can use in order to identify which party family a particular political party belongs to. I 
have chosen to focus solely on political ideology, for a number of reasons, but most 
importantly because I believe that political ideology is the most defining feature for 
classifying a party. The question thus becomes what data best represents a political party’s 
ideology?  
 
The main issue with selecting data is to ensure that the data reflects the core ideological 
features of the party. Therefore, I have chosen to only include official party documents and 
communication as my sources of data. I have thus chosen to use the election and party 
manifesto of the FrP, as wells as the Progress Party’s own website as my data sources. I have 
excluded other sources, such as interviews and biographies, because by including those 
sources I run the risk of including statements that do not reflect the official party line and the 
ideological core of the party. The selection of this as my data sources has been made while 
thinking about both the reliability and the validity of the data and method. Reliability, in 
general, refers to how reliable, or trustworthy, our data is (Grønmo 2016, 242). High levels of 
reliability would mean that if someone else was to conduct the same analysis using the same 
data, the results would be the same. For my thesis to have a high degree of reliability would 
mean that if someone else undertook the same kind of analysis of the FrP, using the same 
kind of data as I have used, that they would come to the same conclusion. Perfect reliability is 
almost impossible, and since my method relies heavily on the interpretation of the researcher, 
it would be more than possible that someone else may come to another conclusion with 
regards to the FrP, even if that person would use the same data and method. Therefore, what 
is important then, for the results to be trusted, is openness and clarity. It is extremely 
important, when doing any kind of interpretive method, that the researcher is open and clear 
with regards to how he interprets the data. This is important because it gives the reader an 
insight into how important aspects of the data were coded and interpreted, but also because it 
makes it easier for others to assess the validity of the results.  
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Validity, meaning both how well the research method and data are suited for answering the 
research question (Grønmo 2016, 447), is also something that I carefully evaluated before 
choosing my method and data. When it comes to the method, I could have chosen other ways 
of measuring ideology. However, I firmly believe that a qualitative content analysis is best 
suited for my purpose. When it comes to the validity of the data I have chosen, I do believe 
that the official election manifesto and the website of the FrP are the best sources for 
analysing the ideological core of the party. Therefore, I believe that the data I have chosen 
will give results that have a high degree of validity.   
 
However, the research method and data I have chosen are not without limitations. All parties 
have factions that to various degrees represent different ideological positions. When it comes 
to the FrP, the party has a long history of a broad liberal faction, as well as an often-opposing 
national conservative faction. This may not be reflected very well in official party documents, 
because they are not the sum of all opinions. An analysis of such documents will therefore 
not necessarily be the best data source for uncovering the different ideological factions in a 
party. I would argue that such documents are better viewed as the core ideological features. 
The aim of this thesis, however, is to find out if nativism, authoritarianism and populism can 
be considered core ideological features of the Progress Party. Therefore, I have decided to 
focus on the data that I believe best captures the true ideological core of the FrP, and that is 
their Political Action Program (Prinsipp og Handlingsprogram) and material from their own 
website. The Political Action Program represents what the party want to achieve in the next 
election period, a period for four years, therefore, for future reference, I will mostly refer to 
these documents as election manifestos.  
 
The election manifesto was an obvious choice to use, mainly because of how this document 
is constructed, and what it reflects. The composition and adoption of the election manifesto 
of the FrP can be explained as being done in roughly two steps. The Program Committee 
(Program- og redaksjonskomiteen) is responsible for composing the manifesto. They are 
responsible for composing an election manifesto that they believe most of the members of the 
National Convention can vote for. They do this by composing a draft of the manifesto, before 
sending this draft to all the local and regional branches of the party. These local and regional 
branches thus review the document, and can then send their feedback to the Program 
Committee if they want to change something. The final adoption of the document however is 
down to the National Convention. When the Program Committee submit their final draft, 
 53 
after consulting with the local and regional branches, they put the document up for debate 
and vote at the National Convention. When the National Convention finally votes and adopts 
the election manifesto, they do so for the next parliamentary period, that is for the next four 
years that the Norwegian Parliament is seated, until a new election occurs. The election 
manifesto is usually composed of two main parts, part one is program of principles (prinsipp 
program) and part two is the action program (handlingsprogram). The program of principles 
in the election manifesto of 2017 only contains 10 pages, pages 7 through 17, and is a 
declaration of the ideals FrP believes in, as well as a declaration of their own ideological 
position. This part is thus best viewed as a normative and subjective declaration of how the 
FrP wants the Norwegian state and society to look like. Part two, the action program makes 
up the brunt of the document, roughly 100 pages, from page 20 to 119 in the election 
manifesto from 2017. In the action program the FrP explains what policy changes they want 
to implement in the next parliamentary period, and it is divided into several parts, each part 
corresponds to a policy area. The action program from 2017 is divided into 14 different parts, 
examples of these parts include “democracy”, “immigration policy” and “work and welfare”. 
This makes it easy to navigate to the parts that it is plausible that the different dimensions of 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism manifests itself. By using my coding frame, I will 
navigate to the parts where it is likely that these features manifest itself, furthermore, it is also 
possible to search for keywords in the document. Corresponding with the coding frame, I will 
search for keywords and navigate the different sections, looking for manifestations of 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism. I have used two election manifestos as my main 
sources of data and analysis in this thesis, those are the manifestos from 2017 and the newest 
one that was adopted in 2021. I have chosen these two documents because I believe they best 
represent the ideologically makeup of the FrP today.  
 
In addition to the Political Action Programme, I have also decided to use the FrPs own 
website as data. The website contains a lot of info on the FrPs own politics, where they have 
several pages that are devoted to explaining their politics and policy proposals. Since they 
themselves have made the website and argue that this reflects their policy, I have taken their 
word for it, and will treat this as official party policy, and thus a reflection of their ideological 
foundation. Their website is organized in such a manner that by going to a section labelled 
“Our Politics” (Vår Politikk), you can easily navigate to different policy issues, such as 
“immigration and integration” (innvandring og integrering), “healthcare” (helse og omsorg) 
and “justice and preparedness” (justis og beredskap). I will thus, according to my coding 
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frame and how I have operationalized the core features of the populist radical right, navigate 
and analyse the sections of their website where it is most likely that these features will 
manifest itself. For example, when it comes to nativism, I will be analysing the pages on 
“immigration and integration”, as well as “healthcare”. Furthermore, the FrPs website have 
their own search engine, making it possible to search for key terms, such as immigration, and 




Chapter 5 - The history of the Norwegian Progress Party 
Chapter 5 will in most part be a descriptive analysis of what I deem the most important parts 
of the development of the party throughout their history. However, although this part aims to 
offer a descriptive account of the development of the FrP, I will also comment and make 
remarks about events and factors that I deem important for the ideological development of 
the party, hoping to add some analytical insight. I have focused primarily on trying to explain 
the roots of the party, factors that made them electorally successful, and main developments 
to their ideological foundation.  
 
The genesis of the FrP (the populist roots of the FrP) 
The Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) was founded as a single-issue party in 1973 by 
charismatic figure and first leader Anders Lange. Contrary to many of the other populist 
radical right parties in Western Europe the FrP was not founded on an anti-immigration, 
nationalist or nativist sentiment, rather it was founded as a single-issue party highly critical of 
the taxation levels in Norway and the highly bureaucratized Norwegian public sector. Lange, 
naming the party after himself, called his party “Anders Lange’s Party for the Substantial 
Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Governmental Interference”, commonly known as Anders 
Lange’s Party (ALP). Lange was also highly critical of socialism, in the 1930s he was a 
member of Fedrelanslaget, who Iversen (1998, 14) characterizes as “a centre-right movement 
which goal was to ensure that the socialists did not gain power in Norway”1. Lange’s disdain 
towards socialism can be understood by his belief in the notion that personal freedom is best 
achieved through a liberal state that protects individual’s personal freedom. He was critical 
towards a state that invaded people’s personal freedom and saw himself as an 
uncompromising protector of the individual against such a state.  Lange was also sceptical of 
the organizational structure and political programs of traditional political parties. He wanted 
to create a loosely organized political movement without the by-laws and political programs 
that characterized traditional political parties. Lange’s vision of how he wanted to structure 
his party as well as his leadership style clearly conforms with Weyland’s (2001) conception 
of populism as a political strategy and leadership style.  
 
 
1 My translation, original statement reads: «en borgerlig samlingsbevegelse som hadde som mål å sørge for at 
sosialistene ikke fikk makten i Norge.» 
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Lange also drew inspiration from the newly created Danish Progress Party (FrPD), created by 
the highly controversial and charismatic Danish lawyer Mogens Glistrup. Glistrup gained 
notoriety and popularity after he appeared on the danish television show “Focus” in 1971, 
arguing that paying taxes was immoral while also revealing that he himself, through what 
must be called “creative accounting” did not pay any income tax at all (Aarhus University 
2011). Glistrup founded the Danish Progress Party shortly after this interview, in 1972, and in 
1973 they contested their first ever election to the Danish Parliament, the Folketing. The 
danish election of 1973 where to be known as a Landslide election, because four of the 
historically established parties, the social democrats, the Left, the Conservative People’s 
Party and the Radical Left, all suffered electoral setbacks. While at the same time several new 
or previously unrepresented parties won seats. This meant that the Danish Folketing’s 
composition changed significantly, with 44% of voters changing the party they voted for and 
over half of the Folketing’s MPs were shifted out. One of the winners of this Landslide 
election were the Danish Progress Party who received 15,9 % of the votes and 28 seats in 
parliament. Lange was heavily inspired by Glistrup, and when Lange held his first public 
speech as chairman of ALP in Oslo on May 16, 1973, Glistrup was himself in attendance also 
making a speech.  
 
Although the ALP, like their Danish sister party, was founded as an anti-taxation and anti-
bureaucracy party, their found founder Anders Lange, clearly had some populist ideas and 
beliefs. The populistic views of Lange were clearly on display on the night of the foundation 
of the ALP. Speaking in front of a crowd of around 1400 people on the 8th of April 1973, in 
Saga Kino, Lange displayed his critical attitude towards the ruling elite in Norway. He talked 
about himself and the people in the audience having the opportunity to represent a “people’s 
movement” that could save their fatherland. Lange clearly exclaimed his populist views and 
rhetoric on this day, even arguing that Norwegians should take back power from their MPs in 
the Norwegian Storting, making remarks like “Norway, with its strong men, does not want to 
be treated like children by their MPs” (Ringheim 2016, 13)2. Lange, who opposed political 
programs, still saw the need for publishing some sort of political action program. Therefore, 
shortly before the founding meeting at Saga Kino in 1973, Lange released his manifest 
containing 14 statements. The manifesto became known as the “we are sick of” manifesto, 
 
2 My translation. Original sentence reads: «Norge med sterke menn som ikke ønsker å være pattebarn under 
stortingsmenn!» 
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because every sentence in the manifesto started with the words “we are sick of” before 
explaining what he was sick of.  
 
The manifesto also exhibits the populist attitude of Anders Lange, where several of the 
statements contain populist critique of the ruling elite in Norway. Lange criticises politicians 
in the manifesto, writing “we are sick of politicians interfering in our private life”3. He also 
directs his attacks towards Norwegian MPs when he writes that “we are sick of members of 
parliament reducing our wages so much that we have to beg for more”4. Using politicians and 
MPs as examples of the ruling elite, Lange clearly portrays his populist agenda when he 
critiques them for interfering in and making the lives of ordinary Norwegians worse. Lange 
also frequently exhibited what Moffitt (2016) refers to as populistic “bad manners”, using 
this as strategy to differentiate himself from the established political elite in Norway. One of 
the most well-known examples of this comes from a debate in 1973, where Lange pulled out 
a Viking sword, while at the same time drinking eggnog and smoking a pipe. In addition to 
populism, the “we are sick of” manifesto also contain a sentence that could easily be 
interpreted as external welfare chauvinism. Lange, through his manifesto, argues that the 
party is sick of paying money in foreign aid to states that use money for armament. The 
overall argument being that these states should use this money otherwise. However, as my 
analysis will uncover, the FrP today is very critical towards foreign aid, and should thus be 
considered external welfare chauvinist. It seems that some of the roots of that were planted 
with Lange at the inception of the party.   
 
The Electoral breakthrough of the FrP 
Like the Danish Progress Party, the ALP also contested their first national election in the 
1973 election to the Norwegian Storting. The election was held only five months after the 
foundation of the party, and 5,1% of the Norwegian electorate voted for ALP. Their electoral 
success, though not as spectacular as their Danish counterparts, was still considered a huge 
success and a big surprise. The ALP received votes from people who had earlier voted for 
both the Conservatives (H) and the Labour Party (AP). From their 108 000 voters, 47% of 
 
3 My translation, original statement reads: «Vi er lei av politikere som blander seg opp i vårt privatliv». 
4 «Vi er lei av stortingsmenn som gjør lønnen så liten at vi må be om mer.» 
The full “we are sick of” manifesto can be found in Ringheim (2016, 14), as well as in the database on political 
manifestos on Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (NSD).  
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them voted for the Conservatives at the last parliamentary election, while 30% came from the 
Labour Party (Ringheim 2016, 36).  
 
Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) highlights two factors that they claim were critical for 
the ALPs electoral breakthrough and initial success. Firstly, they point towards a general 
voter dissatisfaction with the taxation policy of the centre-right government that governed 
Norway from 1965 to 1971 and 1972 to 1973. The post-World War II years in Norway, and 
especially the 1960s and 1970s, saw a rapid and expansive welfare state emerge. Many 
centre-right voters were frustrated with the fact that a change in government from the left-
wing social democrats to the centre-right did not signal a change in policy. The increasing 
level of taxation and continued expansion of the welfare state under a centre-right 
government thus left many voters feeling frustrated and dissatisfied.   
 
Secondly, they point to the European Economic Community (EEC) referendum held in 1972. 
This referendum is considered a major factor because it alienated portions of the Norwegian 
electorate with whom they traditionally voted for. The opinions of the general public on 
whether Norway should become a member of the EEC often went across existing loyalty 
bonds to the party they used to vote for. The Conservatives and the Labour Party were both 
yes-parties, but many of their voters voted no in the referendum. Goul Andersen and 
Bjørklund (1990) explains that the EEC referendum abolished existing loyalty bonds between 
large portions of voters and the established parties. Thereby making it easier for these voters 
to vote for another party in upcoming general elections, then the ones they had previously 
used to vote for. The EEC referendum of 1972 certainly offers some explanatory value as to 
why some voters shifted allegiance from the Conservatives and the Labour Party to the newly 
established ALP.   
The setbacks of the late seventies 
Many pundits and commentators regarded ALP as a flash in the pan party and predicted their 
downfall after their initial electoral success. The Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet were quick 
to comment, predicting their electoral downfall, writing the following in an editorial: “In all 
likelihood, we are dealing with a short-lived creature, but even such insects can cause much 
damage during their lifespan” (Jupskås 2015, 27; Iversen 1998, 49)5. Their prediction could 
 
5 This sentence was translated by Jupskås (2015) for his PHD thesis. The original sentence was found in Iversen 
(1998) and reads the following: «Sannsynligvis har vi med en døgnflue å gjøre, men selv slike insekter kan 
anrette mye ugang i sin levetid».  
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have, and initially looked like, being correct. After the party’s initial electoral breakthrough 
and success in 1973, they were now in for harder times. Internal strife and disagreements 
over party organization, the death of Anders Lange in 1974 and their electoral setbacks in 
1975 and 1977 could have been the end of ALP. However, those who predicted a short-lived 
party would be proven incorrect.  
 
In January 1974, shortly before Lange’s death, the ALP was getting ready for their first ever 
national party convention. The convention was held in Rogaland and present was 40 men and 
one woman, Anders Lange’s wife Karin Lange. Among the issues that were to be debated by 
the delegates were whether the ALP was to have a political program. Anders Lange was 
critical of this, he favoured an unorganized political party, who took stances on issues as they 
appeared. Carl I. Hagen took the opposite stance, he wanted to take the party in a more 
traditional direction, a direction that meant the implementation of a political action program. 
Hagen was not alone on this, several others supported his view, among his supporters were 
prominent delegates like Kristoffer Almås. Ringheim (2016, 43) writes that Almås and 
Hagen challenged the delegates to take action against Lange’s will, and create a political 
program. This angered Lange and started a conflict that culminated in Almås and Hagen 
leaving the party. Despite the conflict, Almås was elected as Vice Chairman and Hagen were 
elected Secretary-General at this meeting, something Lange initially agreed upon. However, 
shortly after the national convention the conflict between Hagen and Lange became national 
news when Dagbladet quoted Lange in saying that Carl I. Hagen would only become general 
secretary in the ALP “over my dead body” (Ringheim 2016, 42)6. After this, Hagen and 
Lange never spoke again.  
 
One would not be alone in being pessimistic about the future of the ALP when the party’s 
popular and charismatic leader Anders Lange suddenly died of heart failure in October 1974. 
However, Lange’s death meant the return of Carl I. Hagen, who sought to revamp the party, 
organizing it more in the mold of a traditional political party. Hagen had left the ALP in part 
because of his differing view with Lange on how the party should be organized. Whereas 
Lange wanted a loosely organized party, based around his own personal style and leadership, 
that was different to the established and traditional political parties. Hagen wanted an 
organized party with by-laws, a political program and a structured political organization. And 
 
6 My translation, original sentence reads: «Hagen blir generalsekretær over mitt lik» 
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the two next elections would prove that change was necessary if the party was to survive, as 
they proved to be highly disappointing for the ALP/FrP. In the regional elections 
(fylkestingsvalg) of 1975, the party only received 1,4% of the vote, the national election in 
1977 proving almost as disappointing, as the party only received 1,9% of the votes, leaving 
the FrP with zero MPs in the Norwegian Storting. In the run up to the 1977 election, the ALP 
adopted its Danish sister party’s name, and from this point on would be known as the 
Progress Party (FrP). The new name in itself however was not enough to turn the tide. With 
almost nothing that resembled a party organization to run an electoral campaign, the party 
crashed out of the Norwegian Storting. Lange’s death in 1974 combined with poor electoral 
results in 1975 and 1977 signaled that change was necessary if the party was to survive.   
 
From a disorganization to organization – Carl I. Hagen takes control 
Arve Lønnum took over as the leader of the party in 1975 after Eivind Eckbo, who had 
functioned as leader since Lange’s death. Lønnum shared Hagen’s conviction that the party 
needed to reform if it was to survive. Lønnum therefore convinced Hagen to return to the 
ALP from the newly formed Reform Party (Reformpartiet), led by former ALP member 
Kristoffer Almås. During the party’s 1976 national convention the party changed its name to 
the Progress Party and Hagen was elected second vice chairman. His reign as second vice 
chairman was short lived however, because in 1978 Hagen was elected as party leader. A 
position he would hold for almost 30 years. Under Hagen’s leadership the party would 
transform itself into more of a traditional political party. Hagen would oversee changes to the 
ideological foundations of the party as well as guiding the party from the political fringes to 
become a highly successful and modern political party. Hagen also revamped the party 
organizationally, professionalizing it and turning into a traditional and modern political party. 
Hagen’s organizational evolution of the FrP is, in my mind, an important reason for their 
sustained electoral success. According to Tavits (2012), parties that are organizationally 
strong have a better chance of electoral success and survival, and I firmly believe that 
Hagen’s ascent to the leadership and his subsequent moves to reform the party made the party 
stronger organizationally. Which in turn greatly contributed to the party’s success and 





Table 4: Leaders of the Progress Party 
Leaders of the Norwegian Progress Party 
Anders Lange 1973-1974 
Eivind Eckbo 1974-1975 
Arve Lønnum 1975-1978 
Carl Ivar Hagen 1978-2006 
Siv Jensen 2006-2021 
Sylvi Listhaug 2021- 
 
When Hagen was elected as leader in 1978 the party was on the fringes of extinction, after 
they were left without any MPs from the general election of 1977. The next decades would 
see the party taking strides, steadily building their voter base. Hagen would also oversee 
several important events that would shape the party, two of these are of great importance and 
deserve to be mentioned. The first is the politicization of immigration policy in Norwegian 
politics, and the FrPs subsequent adoption of anti-immigrant policies. Secondly, Hagen’s 
years as leader will also be remembered for internal struggles. 
 
The inclusion of anti-immigration policies in the FrP 
The campaign and election of 1989 hold an important place in Norwegian political history, 
because it marked the politicization of immigration policy in Norwegian politics. 
Immigration was not a political issue in Norway prior to the 1970s, before this Norway 
received small numbers of immigrants, and those who came were primarily coming from 
other Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland). Countries which are quite 
similar to Norway when it comes to language and other cultural aspects. From 1967 however, 
this started to change, and people from other parts of the world starting to emigrate to 
Norway. Before 1967, Norway had usually had more people emigrating than immigrating. In 
the 15-year period from 1952 to 1966, net-immigration to Norway was at a minus, meaning 
more people move out of Norway than inn. In this period, Norway had a net-immigration of 
minus 19 215. However, since 1967, net-immigration have been steadily increasing, and only 
two years (1970 and 1989) have seen emigration numbers larger than immigration. In the 20-
year period from 1967 to 1986, Norway received in excess of 377 000 immigrants. The low 
immigration numbers of pre-1967 meant that immigration was not an issue on the forefront 
of the political agenda, however, this was about to change with the rising numbers of 
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immigration. Hagelund (2003, 50) writes that as immigration peaked in 1987, with 8600 
immigrants coming to Norway, “newspapers were full of articles about new arrivals, and 
concern arose about what to do with the ‘streams’ and ‘flows’ of refugees entering the 
country”. Attention was beginning to turn towards the problems that immigration was 
causing. Norway had not experienced immigration like this before, and Hagelund writes that 
Norway was not equipped with institutions to deal with this level of immigration. Therefore, 
asylum seekers had to wait long for their applications to be handled, since there was a lack of 
mechanisms in place to deal with issues such as placement and housing for immigrants. 
Many immigrants were put in hotels, and processing of their applications took a long time. 
This new flow of immigrants started to raise concerns in many local communities. Hagelund 
(2003, 50) argues that this new level of immigration and Norway’s lack of institutional 
arrangements to handle them sometimes caused “discontent among the local community and 
sustaining arguments about all the benefits asylum-seekers received for free that allegedly 
were out of reach for most Norwegians”. It is around this time that welfare chauvinist 
sentiments can be found in Norwegian society, and it is certainly around this time that 
immigration became a political issue. The Norwegian Progress party quickly turned their 
attention towards this new issue, and according to Hagelund, they were responsible for 
bringing this issue to the political arena, because they were the ones who sought to make it a 
political issue. Table 5 contains numbers for net-immigration to Norway, organized 
according to different time periods.  
 
Table 5: Net-immigration to Norway: 1952 - 2020 
Years Immigration Emigration Net-immigration 
1952 - 1966 153 340 -172 048 -19 215 
1967 - 1976 176 536 -142 265 34 271 
1977 - 1986 200 806 -152 340 48 466 
1987 - 1996 276 187 -201 604 74 583 
1997 - 2006 379 793 -234 796 144 997 
2007 – 2016 705 736 -313 274 392 462 
2017 - 2020 200 901 -124 795 76 106 
Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB)7 
 
 
7 https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/faktaside/innvandring  
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Politicians became aware of the issues that immigration caused to the unprepared Norwegian 
institution, therefore, in 1974, the Norwegian Storting unanimously decided to temporarily 
stop immigration. During a parliamentary debate in December of 1974, the anti-immigration 
sentiments of Erik Gjems-Onstad, member of Anders Lange’s Party, became known during a 
speech he held. Bjørklund (1999, 138-139) writes that Gjems-Onstad criticized immigration 
from an economic perspective, saying that immigration was a burden for Norwegian 
taxpayers. According to Bjørklund, the FrP first argued against immigration from an 
economic perspective, using welfare chauvinist arguments. It was not until later, from the 
1990s and forward, that the FrP started to argue against immigration using cultural 
arguments. In their election manifesto from 1993, they argue against immigration from a 
cultural perspective, writing the following:  
 
The Progress Party’s restrictive immigration policy, which is supplemented by active integration 
and adaptation to Norwegian social conditions, will prevent contradictions and conflicts between 
population groups based on different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds.8 (FrP 1993). 
 
The culturally based arguments against immigration that emerged in the political program of 
the FrP in 1993 were supported by party leader Carl I. Hagen. During the next decades he 
would make several comments in which he voiced his criticism towards immigration from a 
cultural standpoint. In 1997 Hagen argued that “a society without ethnic minorities is a 
society in harmony” (Bjørklund 1999, 139). Hagen has also at times made anti-Islamic 
statements, statements that can easily be interpreted as Islamophobic. Islamophobia, in this 
context, shall be understood as “indiscriminate negative attitudes and sentiments concerning 
Islam and Muslims” (Bleich 2011, 1581).  In 2006 during an interview with Norwegian 
newspaper Dagbladet he said he feared that Muslims could one day be a majority in Norway, 
and that sharia laws could be implemented in Norway (Dagbladet 2006). Another well-
known example of Hagen’s islamophobia is the incident known as The Mustafa Letter.  
 
During the run up towards the regional elections (kommune og fylkestingsvalg) in 1987, 
Hagen was speaking at a meeting in Rørvik. He argued for stricter immigration laws, and 
warned that immigration could lead to conflict, if Norway let to many Muslims settle here 
 
8 My translation, the original statement reads: «Fremskrittspartiets restriktive innvandringspolitikk, som 
suppleres med aktiv integrering og tilpasning til norske samfunnsforhold, vil forebygge motsetninger og 
konflikter mellom befolkningsgrupper med basis i forskjellig etnisk, kulturell og religiøs bakgrunn.» 
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(Ringheim 2016, 80). During his speech he pulled out a letter he said he had received from a 
man called Muhammed Mustafa and read from it. In the letter, the man calling himself 
Mustafa, claimed that Muslims were coming to take over Norway, and that Norway one day 
would be a Muslim country. The glaring mistake that Hagen had made, was to not check the 
authenticity of the letter, because as it turned out, the letter was fake. Although a fake, the 
letter managed to bring out the Islamophobic side of Hagen. It seems that Hagen to some 
extent had bought into an early version of the now well-known Islamophobic theory of 
“Eurabia”. The Eurabia theory, at its core, is a conspiracy theory that claims that “Europe is 
on the verge of being taken over by Muslims” (Bangstad 2013, 369). Furthermore, Bangstad 
writes that according to the Eurabia theory, the Muslim takeover of Europe will happen by 
immigration and the Muslim populations higher fertility rate in comparison to the native 
population of Europe. The Mustafa Letter contained the main aspects of the Eurabia theory, 
as the last part of the letter reads out how Muslims will take over Norway: “We (Muslims) 
give birth to more children than you, and several orthodox Muslims come to Norway every 
year, men of productive age.” (Ringheim 2016, 79-80)9. The anti-immigration arguments that 
emerged in the FrP during the 1990s were thus a development from their earlier strategies of 
welfare chauvinism. However, the culturally based arguments against immigration did not 
replace the economical based welfare chauvinist arguments, it is better to see them as an 
addition to their overall rhetorical and political anti-immigration strategy.  
 
FrPs focus on immigration as a political issue has certainly paid off for them electorally. The 
rise in immigration levels and the FrPs focus on this issue has certainly garnered more votes 
in their favor. However, their rise and sustained success cannot solely be attributed to their 
focus on immigration. There are certainly other aspects of their politics that are appealing to 
voters; however, one cannot neglect the fact that their focus on immigration has garnered 
electoral support. In fact, scholars like Hagelund (2003) argues that the FrPs focus on 
immigration has given them “issue ownership” over this conflict issue in Norwegian politics. 
Issue ownership means that a party has ownership over a conflict issue in politics, and that 
voters identify this party as dealing with the issue best. The FrPs issue ownership over 
immigration in Norway means that those who consider immigration to be a problem, identify 
the FrP as the party that is best equipped for dealing with this issue. Research of voter 
 
9 My translation, the original statement reads: «vi føder flere barn enn dere, og adskillige rett-troende muslimer 
kommer til Norge hvert år, menn i produktiv alder.» 
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behaviour supports this. Bjørklund (1999, 168) found that almost every voter who answered 
that immigration was the most important issue for them when they went to the polls, had 
voted for the FrP in the local elections of 1995.  
 
The FrP sharpens their stance on immigration 
When the FrP included culturally based arguments against immigration, the welfare 
chauvinism of the party did not disappear. As much became evident in 1995, when the 
parliamentary group of the FrP presented a proposal to measure the costs of immigration to 
the Norwegian state. The years prior to this, which I will explain in the next section, had seen 
several people from the liberal faction of the party leave. This meant that the national 
conservative and anti-immigrant faction of the party had more leeway. They used this to push 
more focus on to immigration. One of the proponents of this shift in focus was Øystein 
Hedstrøm, who at the time was the FrPs spokesperson on immigration policy. The 
parliamentary group of the FrP approved Hedstrøm’s proposal to measure and account for the 
economic costs that immigration had for the Norwegian state, and they thus sent a proposal to 
the government, asking them to investigate this. Hedstrøm however, appeared to do the job 
for them, and presented his own account of the costs this had for Norway. According to 
Hedstrøm’s immigration account, immigrants and refugees cost the Norwegian state 26 
billion NOK every year. Furthermore, Hedstrøm argued that in the year 2090, Norway would 
have 13,2 million immigrants as opposed to only 3,3 million Norwegians (Ringheim 2016, 
131).  
 
Hedstrøm’s immigration account was heavily criticized by many, however several people in 
the FrP praised Hedstrøm’s report. At the national convention held in Haugesund later that 
year, MPs Jan Simonsen and Vidar Kleppe, two of the more right-leaning and national 
conservative people in the party, praised Hedstrøm and said his report was “beautiful, 
thorough, and serious work”10 (Ringheim 2016, 131). Simonsen, known as one of the FrPs 
most ardent supporters of a stronger stance on immigration, portrayed his welfare chauvinism 
during the national convention in 1993 when he said “we cannot let every African stick a 
straw into the treasury. We will have our wallets to ourselves”11 (Iversen 1998, 172). He 
finished his speech at the national convention by saying the following: “Social spending is 
 
10 My translations, original statements reads: «nydelig, grundig og seriøst arbeid.» 
11 «Vi kan ikke la enhver afrikaner stikke et sugerør ned i statskassa. Vi skal ha lommebøkene for oss selv».  
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high enough. Crime is high enough. There must be a party in Norway that dares to say no. A 
party that thinks of our own sick and old, of our own oppressed taxpayers”12 (Iversen 1998, 
173). Simonsen speech thus incorporates a combination of nativism and authoritarianism, 
when he links immigration to both social spending and criminal activity, the implication 
being that immigration leads to more criminal activity. This is in line with Akkerman and de 
Lange’s (2012) argument that populist radical right parties, and actors, sometimes mix 
together authoritarianism and anti-immigration sentiments. 
 
The controversies surrounding Hedstrøm however, was not over. After the release of his 
immigration account, things were about to heat up for Hedstrøm and the FrP, when news 
broke of Hedstrøm’s appearance at a meeting hosted by several prominent nationalists and 
right-wing extremists. On the morning of 3 September, news broke in the Norwegian 
Newspaper Dagbladet that on the day prior Hedstrøm had participated in a meeting at a 
Cinema in Godlia, Oslo. The meeting was hosted by “Den Norske Forening”, which was a 
national conservative association, whose main goal was to limit or stop immigration to 
Norway. Furthermore, Dagbladet could report that in attendance were prominent Nazi 
supporter Bastian Heide, and representatives from three other organizations “Hvit 
Valgallianse”, “Fedrelandspartiet” and “Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring” (Ringheim 2016, 
136). Hedstrøm even held a speech at this event, where he argued that the participants at this 
meeting had to work together in order to stop immigration to Norway (Aftenposten 1996).  
 
Although several people in the FrP were critical of Hedstrøm’s attendance at this meeting, 
party leader Carl I. Hagen noted that he believed that if the party handled the case in the right 
manner, they could come strengthened out of it (Ringheim 2016, 137). However, things only 
turned for the worse when The Norwegian Centre Against Racism (Anti-rasistisk senter) 
could document that large portions of Hedstrøm’s proposals on immigration policy was in 
fact almost perfect transcripts taken from the “Den Norske Forening”. Thor Gjermund 
Eriksen, reporter in Dagbladet at the time, could show that several of the points in FrPs 
official party program was similar to “Hvit Valgallianse’s” program (Ringheim 2016, 140). 
Eriksen had also got tipped by “Hvit Valgallianse”, that there had been several meetings 
between people in the FrP and themselves.  
 
12 «Sosialutgiftene er høye nok. Kriminaliteten er høy nok. Det må være et parti i Norge som tør å si nei. Et parti 
som tenker på våre egne syke og gamle, på våre egne undertrykte skattebetalere.» 
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Although these events led to a media storm and condemnations from several Norwegian 
Newspapers, politicians and others, Hagen’s prediction that the FrP could emerge out of this 
strengthened did prove right, at least when you look at it from an electoral standpoint. The 
FrP, who had gotten 6,8% of the vote in the regional elections of 1991 and 6,3% of the votes 
in the general elections of 1993, doubled their share of the votes, with an electoral support of 
12,8% of the votes in the regional elections of 1995. Like 1987 and 1989, the election of 
1995 had proved to the FrP, that immigration was a political issue that served them well, and 
by making immigration a key political issue in electoral campaigns only seemed to gain them 
votes. Table 6 contains electoral results for the FrP, in both regional elections and 
parliamentary elections, from their inception in 1973 until the most recent in 2019.   
 
Table 6: The Norwegian Progress Party’s results in national and regional elections 




Year Percentage of votes 
(Fylkestingsvalg) 
1973 5 4 1975 2.9 
1977 1.9 0 1979 2.2 
1981 4.4 4 1983 5.8 
1985 3.7 2 1987 11.4 
1989 13.7 22 1991 6.8 
1993 6.3 10 1995 12.8 
1997 15.3 25 1999 13 
2001 14.6 26 2003 17.9 
2005 22.1 38 2007 18.5 
2009 22.9 41 2011 11.4 
2013 16.3 29 2015 9.5 
2017 15.2 27 2019 8.2 
Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) 
 
Internal unrest – liberals vs far right actors 
Carl I. Hagen’s reign as leader of the FrP will be remembered as a period of success, he led 
the party from the fringes of Norwegian Politics, to the centre of it. During his reign, he 
organized and structured the party, something that undoubtedly was important for their 
electoral success. Hagen also oversaw the inclusion of anti-immigration policy in the FrP, 
and according to some scholars (Hagelund 2003), it was the FrP themselves that politicized 
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the issue of immigration in Norwegian politics. However, although his period as party leader 
will be remembered as a hugely successful period, at least in terms of electoral support, the 
party also experienced periods of internal unrest. Unrest that threatened to break up the party, 
and forced many members, influential voices and factions to eventually leave the party. FrPs 
national convention in 1994, popularly known as “Dolkesjø”, and the internal turmoil before 
the 2001 general election, are important events that would shape the party in the near future, 
and in the long run.   
Dolkesjø – A liberal exodus 
FrPs national convention in 1994, held at Bolkesjø, turned out to be one of the most dramatic 
events in the history of the party. What happened was a culmination of several things that 
ultimately led to a large portion of the liberal faction of the FrP leaving the party. The 
national convention in 1994 is often described as a clash between the liberal faction of the 
FrP, and the populist, anti-immigrant and national conservative faction of the party. In the run 
up to the national convention party leader Hagen had, during an annual meeting with the 
regional faction of the FrP (Vestfold FrP), told that immigration policy would be the FrPs 
primary focus in the campaign to the upcoming election regional elections in 1995 (Ringheim 
2016, 109). This was however, not welcomed with enthusiasm by the liberal faction of the 
party, they felt that this meant that the party would stray away from their liberal roots.  
 
Furthermore, the poor electoral results of the general election in 1993, where the FrP only 
received 6,3% of the votes, also contributed to internal unrest. Hagen had made several ad 
hook comments in the run up to this election, one notable example is an interview he did with 
the newspaper VG, where he, without consulting with the party leadership, went back on the 
party’s promise to reduce tax levels in Norway (Ringheim 2016, 111). This angered and 
confused several people in the FrP, especially among the liberals. For them, the FrP had been 
the party for tax reduction, and reversing position on this issue was a fundamental break with 
what they believed was a core feature of their policies. Ellen Wibe, who at that time was 
deputy leader of the party and also part of the liberal faction of the party, strongly disagreed 
with Hagen’s sudden policy shift, and commented to VG: “There must be no doubt that the 
FrP is still a tax relief party. I disagree with Hagen that we should drop tax cuts on income.”13 
(Ringheim 2016, 111). Another issue that also split the party was the question of Norwegian 
 
13 My translation, the original statement reads: «Det må ikke herske tvil om at FrP fortsatt er et skatteletteparti. 
Jeg er uenig med Hagen i at vi skal droppe skattelettelser på inntekt.» 
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membership to the EU. Norway was about to have a referendum on this question in 1994, and 
the FrP was split as to whether they would be a “YES” party or if they were to stay neutral on 
the issue. The liberal faction of the party was mostly in favour of joining the EU and wanted 
the national convention to vote for a resolution stating that the party supported Norwegian 
membership (Ringheim 2016, 115). Hagen, on the other hand, wanted the party to stay 
neutral.  
 
The prelude to the national convention in 1994 was thus characterized by internal turmoil 
between two different ideological factions. The question on the party’s stance on the EU 
referendum was also divisive, where the liberal faction, by and large, mostly favoured a 
“YES” stance. Hagen, on the other hand, took the side of the national conservatives, and also 
preferred to stay neutral on the EU-question. His position as party leader was thus questioned 
by the liberal faction of the party. The national convention became much more than just an 
ordinary party meeting, it became a meeting over the ideological future of the party. During 
the convention, it became clear that Hagen and his faction outnumbered the liberal faction. 
Several prominent members of the liberal faction responded by immediately resigning from 
the party, among them were Ellen Wibe, deputy leader, and four of FrPs 10 MPs. Lars Erik 
Grønntun, then leader of the FrPs youth organization, FpU (Fremskrittspartiets Ungdom), 
summed up the internal unrest and eventual split between the liberal faction and the national 
conservative faction as down to “a deep political disagreement over economic policy, 
immigration and the EU”14 (Ringheim 2016, 121).  
 
2001 – the national conservatives are kicked out 
If the early parts of the 1990s were marked by internal unrest among different factions in the 
FrP, the beginning of the new millennium were almost like a déjà vu. However, the prelude 
to the internal unrest the party were experiencing this time was remarkably different to last 
time. At the turn of the new millennium, the FrP was soaring in the polls. After Jens 
Stoltenberg had taken over as prime minister in March of 2000, the Norwegian Labour Party 
(Ap) had dropped dramatically in the polls. The Conservatives (H), although not in 
government, were suffering the same fate. In June 2000, the two usually biggest parties in 
Norwegian politics were reeling, the Labour Party registered only 23%, while the 
 
14 My translation, the original statement reads: «en dyp politisk uenighet om økonomisk politikk, innvandring 
og EU» 
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Conservatives were down to 14%. All of a sudden Carl I. Hagen, according to the polls, were 
the leader of the biggest political party in Norway, he and many in the party felt the alluring 
lore of governmental power. According to Ringheim (2016, 160), Hagen meant that it was 
now time that the FrP took the next step, into government, and the majority of the FrPs MPs 
agreed with him. However, the liberal exodus after the Bolkesjø convention meant that the 
populists and national conservatives in the FrP had been given greater room to manoeuvre. 
Speculations started circulating that Hagen were trying to get rid of some of the people 
belonging to the populist national conservative faction, who had been on Hagen’s side during 
the Bolkesjø convention. Furthermore, there were brewing rumours that the populist national 
conservative faction was aware of this, and that they themselves were plotting to get rid of 
Hagen (Ringheim 2016, 160-161).  
 
Ringheim (2016, 167) argues that Hagen was convinced that he had to get rid of several 
people belonging to the extreme right of the party, in order to make the party a viable 
coalition option for other parties. According to Ringheim, Hagen feared that the national 
conservative faction, if given to much space to operate, would scare away other viable 
partners, he thus sought to polish the party’s image. And an important step in this plan was to 
get rid of some of the people belonging to the populist national conservative faction. The 
internal struggles that ensued can be seen as a fight over control of the party, as well as an 
ideological struggle. Hagen felt that in order to have control of the party, he had to get rid of 
some of the people that wanted to push the party in a more national conservative direction. 
Furthermore, by getting rid of the populist national conservative faction, Hagen would 
achieve both organizational control as well as making the party a more viable coalition 
partner. Hagen and the FrP suspended Vidar Kleppe, one of the more right leaning members 
of the party, in march 2001. Nine months later Kleppe left the party. Jan Simonsen, another 
member of the national conservative faction, was excluded from the party in October 2001. 
Several others left, and Kleppe and Simonsen responded by creating their own national 
conservative and anti-immigration party, called the Democrats (Demokratene). A party that 
has had limited electoral success in local elections, and that has never received enough votes 
nationally to be represented in the Norwegian parliament.  
 
Although the internal struggles in the early 2000 can be seen as an ideological struggle 
between two competing factions, it can also be interpreted as a struggle over control of the 
party. According to Ringheim (2016, 161), there were rumours that members of the populist 
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national conservative faction were trying to get rid of Hagen. The expulsion and suspension 
of several of the members of the populist national conservative faction can thus be seen as an 
action by the party leadership, and Hagen, to try to remain in control of the party. Although 
Hagen, and his faction, remained in control of the party, his dream of governmental power 
did not materialize. Although the FrP was plagued by internal intrigues and turmoil in the run 
up to the general election of 2001, they still ended up as the third largest party with 14,6% of 
the votes, only trailing the Labour Party and the Conservatives. The Christian Democratic 
Party (KrF) invited The Liberal Party (V) and The Conservatives (H) to talks about a possible 
governmental coalition, and together these three parties took office. Hagen, speaking to 
Ringheim (2016, 215), said the following about the FrP being overlooked as a coalition 
partner: “I was personally hurt and sorry that the other parties were not at all interested in 
talking to FrP about possible government cooperation”.15 It seems that even though Hagen 
had tried making the FrP more palatable, the other parties, in particular KrF, had not bought 
it. They did not want to work with the FrP. As much became evident when KrF snubbed 
Hagen for the position as President of the Norwegian Storting, a position that Hagen wanted. 
The message Hagen got from KrF messenger, Einar Steensæs, was that even though he was 
the best qualified, the majority of the KrF did not back him (Ringheim 2016, 215). According 
to Ringheim, the Conservatives and The Liberal Party also stood by the decision to not elect 
Hagen as President of the Norwegian Storting. Instead, they elected the Labour Party’s 
Jørgen Kosmo.  
 
Although Hagen did not achieve perhaps his ultimate dream, to lead the FrP into government, 
his period as leader of the party was highly successful. When he finally retired as party leader 
in 2006, he could look back at one of the biggest fairy tales in modern Norwegian political 
history. When he took the position as party leader in 1978, the party was on the brink of 
extinction, heavily indebted and after the general election in 1977, they were also left out of 
the Norwegian Storting. During his period as leader, he oversaw changes to the 
organizational and ideological makeup of the party. From being a loosely organized political 
party, he modelled the FrP into a modern political party. Ideologically, the party was founded 
primarily as an anti-tax protest party. Under Hagen’s leadership the party would expand its 
ideological foundations, perhaps most notably, the party politicized the immigration issue and 
 
15 My translation, the original statement reads: «Jeg ble personlig såret og lei meg for at de andre partiene ikke i 
det hele tatt var interessert i å snakke med FrP om mulig regjeringssamarbeid».  
 72 
adopted an anti-immigration stance that gave them issue ownership over this political issue. 
When Hagen left, he passed the torch to Siv Jensen, a young up-and-coming charismatic 
leader, who would achieve what Hagen could not, governmental office. 
 
Jensen leads the FrP into government 
When Hagen stepped down as leader of the FrP in 2006, after holding the position for almost 
30 years, Siv Jensen assumed the position of party leader. Hagen certainly left big shoes to 
fill, during his period, he had taken the party from almost obscurity, to one of the biggest 
parties in Norwegian politics. When he stepped down in 2006, the party was riding on a wave 
of electoral success, having a year prior received their greatest ever vote share in a 
Norwegian general election. With 22,1% of the votes and 38 MPs in the election of 2005, the 
FrP was the second biggest party in the Storting, only trailing the Labour Party. When Siv 
Jensen assumed the party leadership 2006, she was leading the second largest party in 
Norway. Her, and the party’s ambitions, was to turn their electoral support into governmental 
power. Hagen had wanted the same, but he had proved unable to convince the other centre-
right parties to work with him in a coalition. Siv Jensen’s primary job as leader would be just 
this, convincing prospective coalition partners that the FrP was a trustworthy governmental 
partner.  
 
During Jensen’s reign as party leader, she would succeed with taking the FrP to the next step, 
into government. Ultimately, she was able to convince the other centre-right parties that the 
FrP was a viable coalition partner. In the general election of 2013, the FrP achieved their 
penultimate dream, together with the Conservatives they formed their first ever government. 
Important persons close to many of the key actors involved point to the leadership change 
from Hagen to Jensen, and the change in chemistry between the party leaders as an important 
factor for why the centre-right parties were now willing to work with the FrP. For example, 
long serving MP for the FrP Lodve Solholm said that the personal chemistry between Carl I. 
Hagen and the leaders of the other parties on the right were miserable, in particular Jan 
Petersen (H), Kåre Willoch (H), Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF) and Lars Sponheim (V) 
(Ringheim 2016, 277-278). New leader Jensen had a much better personal chemistry with the 
new leaders of the Conservatives (Erna Solberg), the Liberal Party (Trine Skei Grande) and 
the Christian Democrats (Knut Arild Hareide). This new and improved relationship between 
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the leaders of these parties meant that it was easier to work together on finding common 
ground on political issues.  
 
Another important factor that led to FrPs governmental breakthrough was how the 
Bourgeouisie parties started working together to find a common political platform, so that 
they could challenge the socialist government led by Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg had been prime 
minister since 2005, and the centre-right parties wanted a change, however they probably 
understood that governmental change would only be possible by the inclusion of the FrP. All 
of the centre-right, (KRF, V, H and FrP) started working together in different parliamentary 
committees to try to find common grounds for cooperation. Hareide (KrF), said to Ringheim 
(2016, 279), that the four years in opposition together was one of the factors that led to this 
increase in cooperation. Furthermore, Ringheim (Ringheim 2016, 279) argues that when the 
leaders of the centre-right parties started talking together, this signaled to other MPs of these 
parties to start working together.  
 
In 2013, the FrP could for the first time in their history call themselves a government party. 
The party’s relationship with the other centre-right parties had finally gotten to the level that 
they were willing to work with the FrP in a minority coalition government. This marked a 
significant change in the FrPs history. In a period of 40 years, the party had gone from being 
founded as an anti-tax party in 1973 and breaking into the Storting with 5% of the votes. 
After the voters almost abandoned them in 1977, and the party was left without any MPs, the 
party has steadily grown since the late 70s into one of Norway’s biggest parties, and a stable 
presence in the Norwegian Storting. Ultimately leading to governmental office. This section 
has covered the some of the most important events of the history of the FrP. The next section 
will deal more specifically with the research question of this thesis, when I investigate the 
authoritarian, nativist and populist elements in the FrP.  
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Chapter 6 - An analysis of the authoritarian, nativist, and 
populist elements in the Norwegian Progress Party 
 
This chapter contains the results of my analysis. The results will be presented in three 
sections, each section dedicated to each of the core ideological features of the populist radical 
right - authoritarianism, nativism and populism. I will deal with each of these three features 
in turn, starting with authoritarianism, before I move on to nativism and finally populism. My 
findings are also presented in three tables, tables 7, 8 and 9. 
 
The Authoritarianism of the FrP 
This section will deal with the authoritarianism of the FrP. Specifically, I will present the 
findings of my analysis into the authoritarian features of the FrP. Through my analysis of the 
official party literature of the FrP, their own website and election manifestos, I have found 
that the party has clear authoritarian features. However, the authoritarian features of the FrP 
are limited to their policy initiatives. This means that I did not find any signs of authoritarian 
moral values in the FrP, rather I actually found support of the opposite. My analysis thus 
reveals that the FrP does promote authoritarian policy initiatives, but they are to be 
considered liberal when it comes to moral values and traditions.  
I conceptualized authoritarianism along two dimensions, policy initiatives and moral values. 
This section is divided into these two main dimensions of authoritarianism. I will firstly deal 
with the authoritarian policy initiatives, before I move on to my analysis of the authoritarian 
moral values in the FrP.  
 
Authoritarian policy initiatives in the FrP 
Authoritarianism can generally be defined as the overall idea that societies rules need to be 
strict in order for society to be orderly. And an orderly society is viewed as a good and free 
society to live in. Therefore, authoritarian policy initiatives are those initiatives that seek to 
make society’s rules stricter. Generally, one could divide these policy initiatives into two 
main dimensions, (1) policy initiatives that seek to give law enforcement agencies broader 
autonomy to go after criminals, and (2) those initiatives that seek to punish criminal activities 
harsher than they are today. Following my coding frame, I searched for policy initiatives in 
the sections that dealt with justice and immigration policy, while also searching for key 
words according to the subcategories of my coding frame. What I found was substantial 
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support for several authoritarian policy initiatives from the FrP. I will now go through the 
main findings. Table 7 contains the findings and results of my analysis of authoritarianism in 
the FrP. The table is divided into the two subdimensions, authoritarian policy initiatives and 
authoritarian moral values. What follows is then what I found. With regards to policy 
initiatives, I have listed the initiatives that I have coded as authoritarian in table 7. When it 
comes to moral values however, I found that the FrP was liberal when it came to this 
subdimension, I have therefore listed findings that are statements of the FrPs liberal moral 
values.  
 
My analysis shows that the FrP clearly promotes policy initiatives that can be considered as 
authoritarian. In general terms the party believes that harsher punishment for criminal activity 
is a good measure for dealing with criminal activity, because harsher punishment will be 
preventive. The party thus focuses on punishment, rather than rehabilitation, as a measure for 
dealing with criminal activity. Furthermore, they argue in their political manifestos, from 
both 2017 and 2021, that the general level of punitive action in Norway is too low, and that 
they in general want to raise the level of punitive action, for most crimes. Furthermore, they 
want to raise the minimum level of penalty for crimes of higher severity.  
 
The punitive measures taken against criminals shall deter the person from committing new 
criminal acts. The current level of punishment in Norway is too low for many types of crimes, it 
does not harmonize with the population's legal perception. We therefore want higher penalty limits 
in general and a review of the criminal law. In addition, we want to introduce a minimum penalty 
for a number of serious offenses to ensure that the courts impose penalties that are more in line 
with people's legal opinion than is often the case today (FrP 2021, 27). 16 
 
The nature of the authoritarianism in the FrP, manifests itself through different kinds of 
support of policy initiatives that seek to strengthen the police force, punishing criminal 
activity harsher, giving courts broader rights and tools to convict criminals faster and more 
 
16 My translation, the original statement reads: «Straffereaksjonene som iverksettes overfor forbrytere, skal 
avskrekke vedkommende fra å begå nye straffbare handlinger. Dagens straffenivå i Norge er for mange typer 
forbrytelser så lavt at det ikke harmonerer med befolkningens rettsoppfatning. Vi ønsker derfor høyere 
strafferammer generelt sett og en gjennomgang av straffelovgivningen. I tillegg ønsker vi å innføre 
minimumsstraff for en del alvorlige lovbrudd for å sikre at domstolene utmåler straffer som er mer i tråd med 
folks rettsoppfatning enn det som ofte er tilfellet i dag.»  
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efficient. They also want to strengthen the Norwegian military, which can be interpreted as a 
kind of authoritarianism. They also have a lengthy part in their election program linking 
criminal activity with immigration. I will now go through these different manifestations of 
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- Linking criminal activity with 
immigration. 
 
- Harsher punishment for criminal activity.  
 
- Strengthening of the police force. More 
resources and broader autonomy.  
 
- General armament of the police. 
 
- Defense policy (military).  
 
- More effective and efficient courts.  
 
- Creation of “speed courts”, to make the 
judicial system more effective and 
efficient at convicting in cases where 
suspect is apprehended, with compelling 
evidence.  
 
- Lowering age of criminal responsibility to 
14 (currently 15).   
 
- Punishing crimes of a sexual nature 
harsher: this includes allowing chemically 
castration of people convicted of sexual 
crimes and the establishment of a public 











- Found support of the opposite. 
 
- The FrP is morally and 
socially very liberal. 
 
- Found no support for 
traditional family values. 
 
- The liberal side of the party 
manifests itself clearly in this 






Firstly, the FrP is highly concerned with what they argue is a rise in criminal activity, 
especially in Oslo. They have a whole section in their election program for 2021-2025 
dedicated towards criminal gangs (gjengkriminalitet) and how to deal with this issue. This 
section can broadly be explained as containing three parts, firstly they identify the problem, 
secondly, they explain what has caused it, and thirdly they present solutions to deal with it. 
On the first point, they explain the phenomenon shortly and explain that it is important to 
deal with this issue. Secondly, they argue that the reasons behind the growth in gang activity 
is a high degree of non-western immigration, that has created problems of integration, which 
in turn leads to a growth in criminal activity. Thirdly, their solution of this problem is, in my 
opinion, highly authoritarian. They mostly focus on how to catch and punish these 
individuals, instead of dealing with what may be other underlying factors contributing to the 
problem of increased criminal activity. They present many solutions to this problem, for 
example, they want to create closed juvenile hall institutions for underage criminals, give the 
police more resources to deal with the problem, and also create what they call an “exit-
program” to help people get out of gangs. Furthermore, they also argue for harsher 
punishment for individuals involved in criminal activity that can be tied to gangs, they want 
to create new courts that deal with gang criminality that can hand out sentences faster than 
the current system, and finally they also want to punish parents of underage criminals. On the 
last point, the FrP proposes that parents of children under the age of 16 can lose their permit 
of residency (oppholdstillatelse) if the child is convicted of a serious crime. In effect, this 
would mean that parents of children under 16 that are convicted of a serious crime, can be 
sent out of Norway.   
 
It is also apparent, from analyzing the election manifesto of the FrP, that the party’s 
authoritarianism is closely linked with nativism, understood in this context as claiming that 
there is a causal link between high levels of non-western immigration and criminal activity. 
This finding is in line with Akkerman and de Lange’s (2012) argument that the 
authoritarianism and immigration stance of many far right parties’ often go hand-in-hand. 
This certainly appears to be the case with the FrP. The FrP indicates that there is a link 
between high levels of non-western immigration and the rising levels of crime in Norway.  
 
The other policy initiatives that the FrP promotes, that I have coded as authoritarian, deals 
primarily with the policy areas of law enforcement and the courts. When it comes to the law 
enforcement, the FrP believes that in order to be able to punish criminal activity and create 
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order, it is important with an efficient, effective and capable police force. Therefore, they 
want to do several things. Examples include initiatives like giving the police more resources, 
like police dogs and helicopters, implementing changes to the education of police officers, 
and giving the police more resources to be able to fight crime that happens on the internet. 
Furthermore, the FrP also wants general armament of the police force in Norway. In Norway, 
the police do not carry guns around at all times, they only carry guns if the severity of a 
situation allows for it. Otherwise, a police officer’s gun is held locked in his/her car. 
However, the FrP wants to change this, and allow police officers to carry guns around at all 
times, no matter the situation.  
 
When it comes to the judicial arena, the FrP wants to do several things. However, I have 
grouped the policy initiatives when it comes to the judicial arena into two categories, 
effectivization and harsher punishment. On the first point, the effectivization of the courts, 
the FrP is strongly in favor of making the courts more effective and efficient in their work. In 
order to do this, they propose the development of what they call “speed courts” 
(hurtigdomstoler). These speed courts are supposed to be limited to dealing with cases of 
everyday criminal activity, which most likely means cases of lower severity, and they will 
only deal with cases where the police have apprehended the suspect and has compelling 
evidence. The FrP sees the development and implementation of speed courts as a way of 
making the judicial system more effective, so that the courts are able to get more cases 
treated. Another way of making the courts more effective, according to the FrP, is by making 
use of more technology, so that confessions and testimonies can be held digitally.  
When it comes to harsher punishment for criminal activity, the FrP wants to raise the level of 
punishment for several types of crimes. Examples of this include raising the maximum prison 
sentence a person can receive from the current level of 21 years to 50 years. They also want 
to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 15 to 14. Furthermore, every foreign citizen 
that receives a suspended sentence of more than 3 months shall also be expelled from 
Norway. 
 
A final point that I will include in my analysis on authoritarianism is the party’s stance on 
sexual crimes against children. In their election manifesto for 2021-2025, they have a section 
dedicated to this topic alone. The FrP believes there should be done much more in the fight 
against crimes against children of a sexual nature. There are four things in the election 
manifesto of 2021-2025 that I have coded as authoritarian. Firstly, the FrP wants to open up 
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for the possibility that people who have been convicted of molesting children can be 
chemically castrated. Secondly, they want to create a public registry, where people convicted 
of sexual assault must register themselves. Thirdly, they want to remove the statute of 
limitations for these kinds of crimes. Fourthly, everybody that is convicted of severe sexual 
assault against children should automatically receive a sentence of special detention 
(forvaring). Such a sentence is one of the harshest sentences the courts in Norway can give, 
because in effect, such a sentence means that a person must show that he/she is no longer a 
threat to society for him/her to be released. If a convict cannot prove that he/she is a threat to 
society, his sentence can be prolonged, and in theory, could risk life imprisonment, if he/she 
is not able to prove that he/she is no longer a threat. In general, the FrP believes that crimes 
of a sexual nature against children should be punished much harsher than they are today.  
 
The Moral Values of the FrP 
The second subcategory of authoritarianism, defined as authoritarian moral values, is one 
where I found that the FrP deviated from what I theorized many other populist radical right 
parties to position themselves. Whereas it is expected that many, if not most, PRRPs are 
morally and socially conservative, I found the opposite to be true when it came to the FrP. 
The FrP has a broad liberal faction, and their liberal values were reflected in their election 
manifestos and on their website when it came to morals and values. Firstly, in the election 
manifesto of 2017-2021, the FrP labels itself as a liberal people’s party (FrP 2017, 8). 
Furthermore, they highlight several liberal ideas, perhaps most notably the liberal idea that 
individual freedom is a birth given right. They also highlight that everybody should live their 
lives as they see fit, as long as they do not infringe on others. However, they do also 
moderate their liberal position, writing that their values are built around “Norwegian and 
western traditions and cultural heritage, with a basis on the Christian way of life and 
humanistic values” (FrP 2017, 8). However, in general, I will argue that the FrP is a socially 
and morally liberal party. I arrived at this conclusion mostly by the absence of any evidence 
of the contrary. What I mean by this is that I did not find any statements that I interpreted as 
being morally or socially conservative, other than the one above. Therefore, the absence of 
such statements, in combination with how the FrP does label themselves as liberals, led me to 
the conclusion that they are socially and morally liberal.  
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To further explain and exemplify my conclusion that the FrP is a morally and socially liberal 
party, I will turn to the family policies of the FrP. On this political issue, if the FrP was a 
morally and socially conservative party, I would expect to find statements in support of a 
family composition along the traditionally and conservative lines as being made up by a man 
and a woman. Although the FrP does highlight the importance of family, they do not define 
the family along conservative lines, in fact they explain that a family should be built around 
the principles of voluntary composition. The FrP believes that the most important principle 
for family composition, is that a family is composed of people that voluntarily chooses to be 
together. Thereby indirectly arguing that voluntariness trumps the sexual orientation of the 
family members. The FrP seems to argue that what matters is not if a family is composed of 
two married men, or women for that sake, but rather that the marriage is consensual.  
 
I have not found enough evidence to be able to code the FrP as morally or socially 
authoritarian, however, I did find them to be very authoritarian when it comes to their policy 
initiatives. Therefore, my overall conclusion is that the FrP should be considered as a party 
with authoritarian features.  
 
Analysis of the nativist features in the FrP 
When it comes to nativism, I operationalized this ideological feature along two dimensions, 
welfare chauvinism and exclusionary ethno-populism. Welfare chauvinism was divided into 
two subcategories, external and internal welfare chauvinism. Internal welfare chauvinism was 
defined as the idea that a state’s welfare services should be limited to a nation’s own native 
population, while external welfare chauvinism was explained as opposition towards foreign 
aid. The second dimension of nativism, exclusionary ethno-pluralism is the idea that a state 
should be inhabited primarily by its native population. What I have found in my analysis is 
strong support for welfare chauvinism in the FrP, both internal and external. When it comes 
to exclusionary ethno-pluralism, I also found enough evidence to support the argument that 
the FrP should be considered as exclusionary ethno-pluralist. I will now go through each of 
these two dimensions of nativism, starting with welfare chauvinism. Table 8 presents an 
illustration of the nativism in the FrP. It is divided into the three subdimensions of nativism, 
internal and external welfare chauvinism and exclusionary ethno-pluralism. It also contains 
categories of statements that I have coded as belonging to these subdimensions. 
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Welfare chauvinism and the FrP 
It was Ghoul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) who first came up with the term welfare 
chauvinism. They used it to describe the stance that the Norwegian and Danish Progress 
Parties took on how welfare services should be limited to their own nation’s native 
population. With this in mind, I did expect to find support for welfare chauvinist policies in 
the election manifestos and on the FrPs website. However, it was still theoretically interesting 
to research this, given that Andersen and Bjørklund’s theoretical argument is now over 30-
years old. And as it turns out, their argument still holds true. My analysis shows that the FrP 
should still be considered welfare chauvinist, having found support for both external and 
internal arguments of welfare chauvinist policies by the FrP.  
 
When it comes to internal welfare chauvinism, the FrP focuses heavily on the cost of 
immigration. They argue both in terms of immigration as threating for the Norwegian welfare 
state and system, based on universal distribution of welfare services. Their arguments range 
from general statements saying that immigration is a threat to Norwegian society and our 
welfare system, to more policy specific proposals. When it comes to internal welfare 
chauvinism however, there is a strong emphasis on how much money the Norwegian state 
could save, by tightening up its immigration policy. On the FrPs website, under “our 
politics”, and “immigration and integration”, they have a page dedicated to “welfare benefits” 
(sosiale ytelser) (Welfare Benefits - FrP 2021). On this page they explain that they want to 
remove the special benefits (særordninger) that immigrants receive. They do not go into great 
detail what this means, however, they do make one example of such special benefits. They 
argue that disability benefits (uføretrygd) are not given to Norwegian citizens that have lived 
abroad for a couple of years, and that have now moved back, before this person has lived in 
Norway for three years. Refugees, on the other hand, can apply for disability benefits as soon 
as they get to Norway. Other than this one example, the FrP does not mention other kinds of 




Table 8: Nativism in the FrP 
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Another example of the internal welfare chauvinism of the FrP is their focus on the cost of 
immigration. The FrP argues, on the same page regarding welfare benefits on their website, 
that Norway would save approximately 175 million NOK in the first year alone, if special 
benefits to immigrants were removed. Furthermore, they write, that in the future, if special 
benefits were removed, the Norwegian state could save up towards 5.1 billion NOK. They do 
not explain what benefits they mean, other than using the example of disability benefits, and 
they do not disclose how they arrived at this number. The FrPs focus on the cost of 
immigration is something that has a long tradition within the FrP, dating back at least as far 
as the Hedstrøm accounts from the middle of the 1990s.  
 
Another important part of the FrPs policy on immigration and asylum, is their belief that the 
current system for applying for asylum is broken. They propose the creation of a new asylum 
system. They want to create a system where refugees and asylum seekers apply for asylum in 
other “third party countries” (FrP 2021). The FrP argues that asylum seekers and refugees 
who crosses the border to Norway, should immediately be returned to these safe third-party 
countries, if they do not have legal entry papers. These asylum centers will be created outside 
of Europe, and the FrP believes this new asylum system will achieve several things. First of 
all, it will give Norway greater control over immigration, and second it will help combat 
human trafficking. Thirdly, they also believe this new system will help in aiding with the 
many dangers that asylum seekers face when travelling to Europe from other parts of the 
world, like the risk of drowning in the Mediterranean crossing from Africa to get to Europe.  
 
The final subcategory of nativism, ethno-pluralism, was not as prominent in the official party 
literature of the FrP as welfare chauvinism. However, I have found evidence of support for 
exclusionary ethno-pluralist arguments in the FrP. The easiest and most recognizable 
examples of exclusionary ethno-pluralist sentiments would be slogans such as “Norway for 
Norwegians” or arguments that resemble such kinds of slogans. This is what I would argue is 
the most blatant support for exclusionary ethno-pluralism. I have however not found such 
statements, or statements like that, in official FrP literature. I have however, found more 
subtler forms of what I believe is evidence of exclusionary ethno-pluralism. The most notable 
example of exclusionary ethno-pluralism in the FrP is that they are the party that has the 
staunchest anti-immigration stance among the parties that are represented in the Storting. As 
recognized by Hagelund (2003) who argues that the FrP has issue ownership over this 
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political issue in Norwegian politics. Their stance as staunch supporters of stricter 
immigration policies are reflected in both the election program for 2017-2021 and their 
newest program that was adopted in the spring of 2021 for the period 2021 to 2025. In these 
programs the FrP argues that the current asylum system and level of immigration to Norway 
in recent years is not sustainable, to our society or to our welfare system. Furthermore, they 
also argue that immigration poses serious threats to our society, because immigration can 
lead to conflict between different ethnic groups: 
 
There are reasons to believe that sustained immigration by asylum seekers, of only approximately 
the extent that we have had in recent years, will lead to serious contradictions and conflicts based 
on value between different ethnic groups in Norway in the long run. (FrP 2021, 18) 17 
 
Although this statement, and the FrP in general, do not blatantly argue against a multicultural 
society, they are however in the very least, skeptical towards such a society. Mudde (2007, 
19) argued that nativism at its core is an ideology that views non-native elements as 
threatening. I would argue that there is enough evidence in the party literature of the FrP to 
say that they believe that immigration is threatening to the Norwegian welfare state, system 
and society, and furthermore that they believe that immigration can lead to conflict.  
 
There are also more subtler forms of exclusionary ethno-pluralism in the election manifestos 
of the FrP. For example, when it comes to culture, the FrP argues that it is important to 
protect Norwegian cultural heritage. However, the sections that deal with culture in their 
election manifestos mostly deal with other topics, such as sports, media and public health, 
and little attention is directed towards the protection of Norwegian culture. Although 
exclusionary ethno-pluralism is not as blatant as perhaps the other dimensions of nativism, I 
still believe there is enough evidence to conclude that the FrP should be considered as 
promoting exclusionary ethno-pluralist policies and ideas. In summary, I have found 




17 My translation, the original statement reads: «Det er grunn til å frykte at en fortsatt innvandring av asylsøkere, 
av bare tilnærmet det omfang som man har hatt i de senere år, vil føre til alvorlige motsetninger og 
verdikonflikter mellom folkegrupper i Norge på sikt.» 
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Populism and the FrP 
Populism was operationalized as having two subdimensions, identified as democracy reforms 
and elite criticism. The democracy reforms of populism were operationalized as overall 
critique of the current political system as well as initiatives that seek to give people more 
decision-making power. This could be measured through ideas promoting referendums and 
different kinds of citizens’ initiative. Elite criticism was operationalized as arguments that 
critique some sort of elite, for example people belonging to the cultural, economic or political 
elite, or often also members of the media. Elite criticism can also manifest itself by an actor 
claiming to represent “the pure people” or being “the voice of the people”. Such an actor will 
then often put himself in opposition towards an antagonistic group, referred to as “the corrupt 
elite”. I will now go through each of these two features of populism in turn, starting with 
democracy reforms, before I move on to elite criticism.  
 
The Democracy reforms of FrP 
When it comes to the first subcategory of populism, democracy reforms, the FrP exhibits 
traits that I deem as populist, especially when it comes to how they want to reform 
Norwegian democracy. First, they argue that there are “weaknesses” in the Norwegian 
democracy (FrP 2017, 12). They do not go into great detail about what exactly these 
weaknesses are supposed to be, but they offer some general explanations and proposes some 
changes to Norway’s political system. It is evident however, that one of the “weaknesses” the 
FrP sees in Norway’s democratic system is that citizens have too little direct influence over 
the policy making process. Therefore, the FrP argues strongly for Norway to adopt a system 
where referendums are more frequently used. The FrP sees this as a step towards making 
citizens more engaged in the political process, as well as giving citizens more direct decision-
making power. 
 
The Progress Party sees weaknesses in our democracy. A system should therefore be introduced in 




18 My translation, original statement reads: «Fremskrittspartiet ser svakheter ved vårt demokrati. Det bør derfor 
innføres et system der velgerne, gjennom folkeavstemninger, får direkte avgjørende beslutningsrett.» 
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The FrPs support for referendums is something that has been a staple of their political 
programs, dating back as far as their election manifesto of 1977 (FrP 1977, 15). Their support 
of referendums is easily recognizable, as they often advocate for their use on several issues. 
For example, during the migration crisis of 2015, the FrP argued that the Norwegian 
electorate should decide, through a referendum, whether Norway should take in 
approximately 8000 refugees (NRK 2015). Another issue involving referendums that is 
highlighted on their own website, is the issue of wind power. Many Norwegian municipalities 
want to build wind power stations, however there are many that opposes this. The FrP argues 
that the solution to this disagreement is to decide the issue through the use of a referendum. 
Furthermore, in 2020, FrPs MP Erlend Wiborg, fielded a law proposal for binding 
referendums on initiative. In essence, the proposal that Wiborg fielded in the Norwegian 
Storting was that if 300 000 Norwegian citizens demand an issue to be put to a referendum, 
the Norwegian Storting has to abide by this. In this case a binding referendum means that the 
results of the referendum must be followed by the Storting. What is interesting however, is 
Wiborg’s explanation for why it is important that referendums become part of Norway’s 
political system:  
 
We have far too few referendums in Norway. The politicians who are afraid of this proposal 
should search their inner selves, the country is for the people, not the politicians. FrP has always 
fought to shift power from politicians and bureaucrats, back to most people.19 (FrP 2020).  
 
This statement from Wiborg is a great example of the populism of the FrP. The FrP is critical 
towards power being concentrated in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats, and they see 
referendums as one step towards giving more power to the people. Table 9 contains the 
results of my analysis of populism in the FrP. The table is divided according to the 
subdimensions of populism, democracy reforms and elite criticism, and how these features 





19 My translation, the original statement reads: «Vi har alt for få folkeavstemninger i Norge. De politikere som 
er redd for dette forslaget bør gå i seg selv, landet er til for folket, ikke politikerne. FrP har alltid kjempet for å 
flytte makt fra politikere og byråkrater, tilbake til folk flest» 
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- They critique the Norwegian 
political system.   
 
- FrP promotes using more 
referendums.  
 
- FrP wants to discontinue and 
shut down The Norwegian 
County Municipality and the 
Sami-Parliament.  
 
- Raise the electoral threshold.   
 
- Give the Norwegian Storting 
the right of dissolution.  
 
- Reducing the bureaucracy.  
 
- Critical towards the Norwegian 









- They critique the current system 
where Norway has a national 
broadcaster – the NRK. The FrP 
sees the NRK as a threat to a free 
and independent press.  
 
- FrP presents themselves as the party 
for “most people”.  
 
- Portrays themselves as the 
“protector” of “most people” and 
their interests.  
 
- They argue, in general terms, to 
give power to the people. 
 
- Anti-statism arguments. 
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Another political issue that the FrP has routinely argued against is the expansion of the 
Norwegian bureaucracy. This is something that Wiborg highlights in the statement recited 
above and is also something that is reflected in their political manifestos. In general, their 
critique towards the bureaucracy is aimed at the expansions of the number of employees in 
ministries, directorates and other government related agencies. They are also highly 
concerned with the resources being spent on the bureaucracy; therefore, they want to reduce 
the bureaucracy and one of the solutions they present is to terminate and lay down the 
Norwegian County Municipalities (fylkeskommunene). One of the reasons for this is, 
according to the FrP, that they lack legitimacy: “The county municipality and regions do not 
have sufficient legitimacy as an independent level of administration”20 (FrP 2017, 22). The 
FrPs anti-bureaucracy stance has been coded as populist because I believe that the FrP sees 
the bureaucracy as a governmental entity that has grown to large, and therefore does not 
serve the people. Therefore, the FrP sees the reduction of the bureaucracy as a step towards 
giving the power back to the people. Their critique of the bureaucracy has thus been 
interpreted as the FrP acting as “the voice” of the “pure people”, and the grievance they are 
voicing are that the growing bureaucracy is both inefficient, a drain on resources and 
illegitimate. The populism of the FrP, reflected in their anti-bureaucracy stance, has an aspect 
of anti-statism to it. Anti-statism is according to Gallaher (2009, 260) “opposition to the state 
and its power to regulate social, economic and political life”. My analysis has uncovered that 
the FrP is highly critical towards the Norwegian state, and in particular the bureaucracy, 
regulatory power. Thereby leading me to the conclusion that the populism of the FrP has an 
anti-statism aspect to it.  
  
The Party for the Common Man 
Elite criticism can manifest itself as direct critique against a group that is considered to wield 
some sort of power, but it can also manifest itself as acting as the “voice of the people”. 
When it comes to the FrP the elite criticism they espouse can generally be grouped into these 
two categories. The aforementioned critique that the FrP directs at the growing bureaucracy 
in Norway also fits into the elite criticism subcategory of populism, mainly because their 
critique against the bureaucracy is rooted in their belief that this level of government in 
 
20 My translation, the original statement reads: «Fylkeskommunen og regioner har ikke tilstrekkelig legitimitet 
som selvstendig forvaltningsnivå.» 
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Norway does not have legitimate support from the people. Also, since the bureaucrats 
obviously wields some sort of power, the FrPs anti-bureaucratic stance can be interpreted as 
anti-elite sentiments. However, I coded this under democracy reforms, because their 
proposals to change the bureaucratic makeup of the Norwegian system would mean 
systematic changes to our political system. It could, however, easily be coded as elite 
criticism as well, seeing as their critique towards the bureaucracy contains both elite criticism 
as well as proposals to reform the system. The importance is not into which subcategory of 
populism the anti-bureaucratic sentiments of the FrP gets coded, but rather that it is 
recognized as populism.   
 
The elite criticism of the FrP, as exhibited on their website and election manifestos, mostly 
revolved around how they portray themselves as the party for the people. On their website 
there are several references to how the FrP is working for “the common man”. When it comes 
to their rhetoric surrounding their positions as “the party for the people”, there needs to be 
some explanation regarding the translation of this term from Norwegian to English. In 
Norwegian, they often use the term “folk flest”, which can roughly be translated to “most 
people”. However, the meaning of the term “folk flest” can be understood as referring to “the 
common man”, meaning the people in general. However, it could also refer to the majority of 
people. The importance of this term, however, is that the FrP routinely refers to themselves as 
the party for “most people”, whilst also portraying themselves as the protectors of this group. 
Examples of the FrP portraying themselves as the party for “most people”, is manifold, both 
on their website and in their election manifestos. The following examples are all taken from 
the election manifesto of 2017: “we want to make everyday life easier for most people”; 
“power should be moved from politicians to most people”; “our program lays out how we 
want to give more freedom and security to most people”21. The FrP routinely argues that they 
are the party for the people, and this has thus been coded as populism.  
 
The final example of populism in the FrP that I want to include, is their critique of the current 
media system in Norway. Norway has a state owned and financed general broadcaster, the 
NRK, and the FrP argues that the media is not independent if it is dependent on financial 
support from the state. Furthermore, they argue that Norway is in danger of having a media 
 
21 My translations, the original statements reads: «vi vil skape en enklere hverdag for folk flest»; «Makt bør 
overføres fra politikerne til folk flest.»; «Vårt program forteller hvordan vi vil gi mer frihet og trygghet til folk 
flest.» 
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landscape that is less critical of the state’s actions because of the financial support they 
receive, therefore they propose that the state should sell the NRK and stop its financing of the 
media. I have coded this as populism, even though the FrP does not label the media directly 
as corrupt or anything in the realm of that. However, since the FrP argues that the Norwegian 
media landscape is not independent, and that the business is at risk of not being able to carry 




Chapter 7 - Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this final chapter I will discuss my findings, as well as if the FrP should be considered a 
populist radical right party, which I will argue that they should. I will also present some 
concluding remarks, recapping what I have done and reiterating my results.  
 
Having found support for authoritarianism, nativism and populism in the FrP, the main 
question that needs to be answered is whether these features should be considered core 
ideological features of the party. According to Mudde (2007, 40) a party cannot be 
considered as being part of the populist radical right party family if these features are not 
considered core ideological features. He writes that he excludes “political parties that have 
significant ideological wings that are not populist radical right.” (Mudde 2007, 40). One of 
the parties that Mudde excludes from his list of populist radical right parties is the FrP. He 
argues that the FrP is a neoliberal populist party (Mudde 2007, 47), and therefore not populist 
radical right. One of the reasons for why he excludes the party is because, as he argues, 
“nativism does not constitute part of its core ideology” (Mudde 2007, 47). He does however 
acknowledge that the FrPs electoral campaigns can on occasion be classified as highly 
xenophobic, and that they should be considered as welfare chauvinist. However, his issue 
with classifying the FrP as populist radical right seems to lay with how he conceptualizes 
core ideology. Core ideology, according to Mudde (2007, 40), is something that most 
members of the party would agree upon. But how do we know that most of the members of a 
political party agrees upon an ideological issue, and furthermore, how do we define and 
measure “most people in a party”?  
 
I present the argument that election manifestos and official party documents should be 
considered as manifestations of core ideological features of a political party. I would also 
argue that most people in the FrP would agree upon the argument that these documents 
represent their parties’ core ideological features. This has to do with the way these 
documents, especially the election manifestos, are composed. As I explained earlier, the 
election manifestos of the FrP are voted on at the national convention, and the document is 
subject to review by every local branch of the FrP before the national convention. These 
branches can, before the national convention, make suggestions for changes, that are thus 
voted upon. Therefore, I would argue, that this document represents the core ideological 
features of the FrP, because core members of the party have voted to adopt this document. 
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Although there may be dissenting voices, the majority of the party has to accept the 
document for it to be adopted.  
 
The second problem that Mudde has with the FrP, seems to be with the fact that the FrP has a 
broad liberal faction. Mudde prefers to exclude parties with other ideological factions, I 
however believe this is a fallacy, especially in the case of the FrP. First of all, I would argue 
that it is wrong to exclude the FrP simply because they have a neoliberal faction. I firmly 
believe that it is entirely possible to be economically liberal, while at the same time being 
authoritarian, nativist and populist. I will argue that it is possible to mix economical 
liberalism with the ideological features of the populist radical right. Kitschelt (1997) made 
the argument that the winning formula for many of these new far right parties was down to 
their adoption of neoliberal economic policies in combination with authoritarianism. As an 
extension of this, I would argue that the FrPs winning ideology is their combination of 
neoliberal economic policies, in combination with an authoritarian stance on law and order, a 
very tough stance on immigration, recognized by their issue ownership on this topic 
(Hagelund 2003), as well as arguing that they are the party that protects the people. By 
combining the ideological positions of authoritarianism, nativism and populism, the FrP is 
able to appeal to voters on a broad specter, they can appeal to voters that consider themselves 
neoliberals, as well as voters that hold authoritarian, nativist and populist ideals. In other 
words, the FrP has found their own winning ideological formula, that has proven electorally 
successful over several decades.  
 
Furthermore, the populist radical right is a highly heterogenous party family, at least when 
comparing this party family to other party families. When Jungar and Jupskås (2014) 
examined populist radical right parties in the Nordic region, they found that this party family 
was amongst the least coherent party families, when it came to ideology. By using data from 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 2010 and from the Comparative Manifesto Project, Jungar 
and Jupskås, among other things, examined the ideological coherence among different party 
families. Among these were the populist radical right parties in the Nordic. They measured 
ideological coherence to see whether the PRRPs in the Nordic region should be considered a 
new and distinct party family. They measured ideological coherence both with and without 
the FrP and found that the FrP did deviate from the other PRRPs in the region, arguing that 
the FrP was “less authoritarian and more economically right-wing” (Jungar and Jupskås 
2014, 227). However, what is interesting is that even when they removed the FrP from the 
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populist radical right family, this party family still proved to be amongst the least 
ideologically coherent party families. Jungar and Jupskås showed that although the Nordic 
populist radical right parties were more coherent ideologically when they left out the FrP, this 
party family was still among the most heterogenous party families. The point I am trying to 
make here, is that the populist radical right is a highly heterogenous party family. Therefore, 
even though the FrP may have a strong liberal faction and therefore may deviate from other 
populist radical right parties, especially when it comes to economic policy. I strongly argue 
for the inclusion of the FrP in the populist radical right party family, simply because I believe 
there is room for the party, even though they may deviate on some ideological positions. The 
party does not deviate too much, in my opinion, when it comes to the core ideological 
features of the populist radical right, to warrant their exclusion from this party family.  
 
A final argument has to do with nativism specifically. Mudde argues that the FrP are not 
nativist at its core. I disagree. As I have demonstrated, the FrP does espouse enough nativist 
arguments in their election manifestos to be classified as nativist. As I have shown, there is 
strong evidence to support the fact that the FrP is welfare chauvinist, both internally and 
externally, as well as advocating exclusionary ethno-pluralist arguments.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis started with the simple question of whether the FrP should be considered a 
populist radical right party. As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, I argue that there 
is enough empirical evidence to support the fact that the FrP should be included in this party 
family, on the basis of their ideological stances on authoritarianism, nativism and populism. 
Despite the party having a broad liberal faction, my position is firm and thus deviates from 
Muddes conclusion with regards to the FrP. Although liberalism is a core feature of the party, 
I do not believe this excludes them from membership. The reason for this is that 
authoritarianism, nativism and populism are also core features of the ideological makeup of 
the party. I would argue that an important part of their ideological appeal is their combination 
of these four ideologies. Although this makes the party a difficult case to evaluate and place, 
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